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That [Boards of Education] are educating the young for citizenship
is reason for scrupulous protection of [c]onstitutional freedoms of
the individual, if we are not to strangle the free mind at its source
and teach youth to discount important principles of our
government as mere platitudes.
West Virginia v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943)
F**kn’ with me ‘cause I’m a teenager/ With a little bit of gold and
a pager/ Searchin’ my car, lookin’ for the product/
Thinkin’ every ni**a is sellin’ narcotics.
N.W.A., F**k tha Police, on STRAIGHT OUTTA COMPTON
(Priority 1988).
I. INTRODUCTION
In many of America’s public high schools, a dangerous lesson is being
taught.  It is not in any textbook or lesson plan, nor is it the subject of a
pop-quiz or standardized test, yet it is reinforced everyday in the hearts
and minds of students as they are patted, frisked, and searched by school
police, sniffed by drug-detecting dogs, or confined by fences topped with
barbed wire.1  It is a lesson in inferiority, in lowered expectations of pri-
vacy, and in second-class citizenship.  It is a lesson that perpetuates the
social norms that criminalize youth.  It is a lesson that stays with them for
life.
1. E.g., Layron Livingston, New Dress Code, Barbed Wire Fence at John Tyler Raises
New Concerns, KLTV, (Aug. 9, 2010, 3:26 PM), http://www.kltv.com/global/Story.asp?s=
12523930 (identifying plans to build a security fence at John Tyler High School); Christo-
pher O’Donnell, School’s Prospects Seem Dim, SARASOTA HERALD TRIB., Aug. 31, 2010,
at B1, available at 2010 WLNR 17372495 (describing a school in Bradenton, Florida sur-
rounded by a chain-link fence and barbed wire); Erika Mellon, HISD Clears Fences of All
Barbed Wire, HOUS. CHRON., Feb. 26, 2010, at A1 (mentioning a superintendent’s dissatis-
faction with the way a barbed-wire fence appeared to the public); “Correctional” Look All
Wrong for School, VA. PILOT & LEDGER-STAR, Nov. 29, 2008, at 6, available at 2008
WLNR 22880210 (commenting on how a school resembles a prison by virtue of its appear-
ance); Assembly Point—Breaking the News, TIMES EDUC. SUPPLEMENT (London), Mar. 20,
2009, at 38, available at http://www.tes.co.uk/article.aspx?storycode=6010487 (discussing
the role that terrorism plays in shaping the views of safety in schools).  The Times Educa-
tion Supplement advised school administrators to:
Remind pupils that school is probably one of the safest places to be. . . .  Go through
each of the things they can see in their day-to-day school life and show photos of them
in and around your school: walkie talkies so teachers can keep in touch with each
other; fewer entrances to the school (most schools only have one way in - often with
full-time receptionists); identity cards for pupils and teachers and special passes for
visitors; swipe cards to get in and out of the building; CCTV cameras to check on
playgrounds and corridors; and higher fences and walls, often with barbed wire on top.
Assembly Point—Breaking the News, supra.
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In theory, a public education should provide all Americans with access
to resources that cultivate literate, skilled, critical thinkers who are pre-
pared to participate in higher education and the global marketplace.  But
perhaps public education’s most important role is in the creation of re-
publican citizens.2  As Chief Justice Warren eloquently stated in Brown v.
Board of Education,3 “[public] education is the very foundation of good
citizenship.”4  Since Brown, the Court has continually recognized the cru-
cial role of education in American society, noting that “public schools
[are] a most vital civic institution for the preservation of a democratic
system of government,”5 and that “education is necessary to prepare citi-
zens to participate effectively and intelligently in our open political sys-
tem . . . .”6  While including civic education in the curriculum is
important, part of this citizen education is achieved through extra-curric-
ular political and legal socialization that occurs in school, because school
is a place where students regularly interact with social control authorities,
such as school officials, police officers, and are exposed to rules, social
norms, and the moral values of mainstream society.7  The Court itself ac-
knowledges the socialization function of school, citing to research regard-
ing education and political socialization.8
2. Hilary Putnam, A Reconsideration of Deweyan Democracy, 63 S. CAL. L. REV.
1671, 1697 (1990) (“The extent to which we take the commitment to democracy seriously is
measured by the extent to which we take the commitment to education seriously.”).  An-
other writer notes that:
The American decision for independence added a further dimension to the concept
of the informed citizen. . . . [R]epublican governments, it was well known, rested on
the virtue of their citizens: their public-spiritedness, their willingness to subordinate
private interest to public good, their capacity to monitor their rulers for signs of tyran-
nical ambition, their knowledge of the essential rights government existed to protect.
A republican government required a republican society. . . . Americans had to be
made into republican citizens, citizenship required education.
Jack N. Rakove, Once More into the Breach: Reflections on Jefferson, Madison, and the
Religious Problem, in MAKING GOOD CITIZENS: EDUCATION AND CIVIL SOCIETY 240 (Di-
ane Ravitch & Joseph P. Viteritti eds., 2001).
3. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
4. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
5. Sch. Dist. of Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 230 (1963) (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
6. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972).
7. Jeffrey Fagan & Tom R. Tyler, Legal Socialization of Children and Adolescents, 18
SOC. JUST. RES. 217, 217 (2005).
8. Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 77 (1979) (“These perceptions of the public
schools as inculcating fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic
political system have been confirmed by the observations of social scientists.”); Plyler v.
Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221–22 (1963) (stating that education provides “the means to absorb the
values and skills upon which our social order rests”).
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Unfortunately, in the years since Brown many of the gains in educa-
tional equality have been lost and the achievement gap between subur-
ban and urban schools has widened.9  The passionate rhetoric regarding
citizen education epitomized by Brown has faded away as large metropol-
itan school districts face a myriad of serious challenges, including inade-
quate funding, low literacy, high dropout rates, teen pregnancy, and
legitimate school safety concerns.  Amid such headline-grabbing issues,
public education’s special function of preparing young people for demo-
cratic citizenship is sidelined.  Citizen education gives way to “ghetto edu-
cation” where, instead of being “‘inculcate[d] [with] the habits and
manners of civility as values . . . indispensable to the practice of self-
government,’” students are treated as threats to public safety the minute
they walk through the metal detector at the school house door.10  Once
inside, they are regulated through mechanisms of fear and control, often
unable to avail themselves of even basic constitutional rights.11  “Educat-
ing for citizenship, work, and the public good has been replaced with
models of schooling in which students are viewed narrowly—on the one
hand as threats or as perpetrators of violence . . . .”12  Citizen education
devolves into ghetto education when schools adopt “disciplinary practices
that closely resemble the culture of the prisons.”13  Even the physical
9. GARY ORFIELD & CHUNGMEI LEE, THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, HISTORIC REVER-
SALS, ACCELERATING RESEGREGATION, AND THE NEED FOR NEW INTEGRATION STRATE-
GIES 18 (2007), available at http://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/k-12-education/
integration-and-diversity/historic-reversals-accelerating-resegregation-and-the-need-for-
new-integration-strategies-1/orfield-historic-reversals-accelerating.pdf.
10. Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986) (quoting CHARLES A. BEARD
& MARY R. BEARD, THE BEARDS’ NEW BASIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 228
(1968)).  I will address the phenomenon of “ghetto education” in a forthcoming article.
11. See generally NAACP LEGAL DEF. & EDUC. FUND, Dismantling the School to
Prison Pipeline (2005), available at http://naacpldf.org/files/publications/Dismantling_the_
School_to_Prison_Pipeline.pdf (discussing how under-funding, over-policing, extensive
testing regimes, alternative schools placements, and overzealous discipline policies leave
students with unmet educational needs and contribute to the school-to-prison pipeline).
For example, in Wake County North Carolina, the Wake County Public School System
interrogates students, without proper Miranda warnings, in the presence of police and
without a parent, guardian or lawyer present. LARSON LANGBERG & CARY BREGE, AD-
VOCATES FOR CHILDREN’S SERVICES, ZERO TOLERANCE FOR THE SCHOOL-TO-PRISON
PIPELINE IN WAKE COUNTY: MAGNITUDE OF THE CRISIS 2 (2009), available at http://www.
legalaidnc.org/public/Learn/Statewide_Projects/ACS/ACS_Publications/IssueBrief_Dec-
09_TheSchool-to-PrisonPipelineInWakeCo.pdf.
12. HENRY A. GIROUX, YOUTH IN A SUSPECT SOCIETY: DEMOCRACY OR DISPOSABIL-
ITY? 95 (2009).
13. Id. The War on Kids, a documentary by Cevin Soling, depicts how American pub-
lic schools continue to become more dangerously authoritarian, controlling children by
subjecting them to prison-like security, arbitrary punishment, and forced prescription of
dangerous drugs such as Ritalin. THE WAR ON KIDS (Spectacle Films 2009).
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structures of some schools resemble a prison.14  The socialization that oc-
curs in these schools criminalizes youth by normalizing restrictive means
of social control.  Children socialized in such an environment are ill pre-
pared for active and engaged citizenship, but are well on their way to
political marginalization, disenfranchisement, and incarceration.
The dominant narrative of youth criminalization, which applies in par-
ticular force to inner-city minority students, casts school children as dan-
gerous, violent, drug-dealing, gang-affiliated, out-of-control
troublemakers.  Teachers and fellow students need protection from these
menacing ambassadors of street thuggery.15  The Supreme Court adopted
this narrative in New Jersey v. T.L.O.,16 where, under the rubric of school
safety, students were stripped of the full protection afforded by the
Fourth Amendment; probable cause, rather than reasonable suspicion,
became the standard in school searches.17  The sacrifice of students’
rights in the name of public safety comes at a cost, especially because
public schools provide such an important forum for democratic socializa-
tion.  School is where children learn about the law and, at times, encoun-
ter the law first hand.  Those encounters can either foster constitutional
notions of autonomy and individual liberty, or undercut them.  Moreover,
society has an interest in the development of “fundamental values neces-
sary to the maintenance of a democratic political system.”18  Models of
school discipline that undervalue these concepts through reduced individ-
ual privacy for students and the increased use of law enforcement officers
to enforce school rules “constructs a narrow range of meaning through
which young people define themselves” because law, and the Constitu-
tion in particular, is more than just a set of rules.19  It also serves as a tool
of political and legal socialization, sending a normative message to those
within its reach about their relationship with government, society, and the
law itself.
What kind of message is conveyed when students are subjected to pats,
frisks, sniffs, and searches on a regular basis?  Children, particularly ado-
lescents, who are subjected to these searches under the very low bar of
14. ERICA MEINERS, RIGHT TO BE HOSTILE: SCHOOLS, PRISONS, AND THE MAKING
OF PUBLIC ENEMIES 2–3 (2007) (“Schools look an awful lot like prisons, and sometimes
schools look more like prisons than do real detention centers.”).
15. Thuggery is defined as “a cutthroat or a ruffian; a hoodlum.” Thuggery, THE
FREE DICTIONARY, http://www.thefreedictionary.com/thuggery (last visited Nov. 5, 2011).
16. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
17. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340, 343 (1985).
18. Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 77 (1979).
19. Henry A. Giroux, Locked Out and Locked Up: Youth Missing in Action from
Obama’s Stimulus Plan, ALTERNET (Feb. 21, 2009), http://www.alternet.org/rights/127460/
locked_out_and_locked_up%3A_youth_missing_in_action_from_obama%27s_stimulus_
plan/?page=entire.
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reasonable suspicion, may feel that the law is unfair and question its legit-
imacy because they have been treated with distrust and disrespect by
adults in positions of authority.20  Even if they do not understand the
vagaries of reasonable suspicion and how it differs from probable cause,
young people can appreciate basic concepts of fairness, dignity and re-
spect.21  Repeated experiences with legal actors who seem to abuse their
authority contributes to a sense of humiliation, rejection, and alienation
that eventually leads students to seek acceptance and recognition in
other, less “mainstream” venues.22  The constant suspicion with which
students are regarded under the current paradigm pushes them into a
defensive posture that hinders their ability to become active and engaged
citizens of their community and nation.23  Disengaged from the “funda-
mental values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political sys-
tem,” youth salvage their dignity by plugging into an oppositional culture
born in despair and steeped in violence, decreasing the legitimacy of the
rule of law, and, in some instances, feeding the school-to-prison
pipeline.24
20. See Fagan & Tyler, supra note 7, at 231 (showing the respect demonstrated by
legal actors, such as the police, school disciplinary staff, and store security guards in shap-
ing adolescents’ perceptions about the legitimacy of the law and legal actors). See also
Brenda L. Townsend, The Disproportionate Discipline of African American Learners: Re-
ducing School Suspensions and Expulsions, 66 EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN 381, 382–83
(2000) (arguing that when disciplinary rules are perceived as unfair, students feel rejected
and powerless and are sent a message that they are incapable of following rules).
21. See generally RICHARD L. CURWIN ET AL., DISCIPLINE WITH DIGNITY (1988) (ar-
guing that attacks on dignity are the most significant contributor to chronic behavior
problems in school because when students’ value and self-worth are consistently under-
mined, they protect their fragile sense of self-worth by rejecting mainstream values and
notions of success).  The deep sense of frustration, born out of their inability to gain ac-
ceptance of teachers, administrators and school officials colors their attitudes and beliefs
about the legitimacy of school rules and the benefits of conforming to the rules. Id.
22. ELIJAH ANDERSON, CODE OF THE STREET: DECENCY, VIOLENCE AND THE
MORAL LIFE OF THE INNER CITY 96 (1999).
When students become convinced that they cannot receive their props from teach-
ers and staff, they turn elsewhere, typically to the street, encouraging others to follow
their lead . . . .  [I]nvest[ing] themselves in the so-called oppositional culture . . . .  Such
a resolution allows these alienated students to campaign for respect on their own
terms, in a world they control.
Impacted by profound social isolation, the children face the basic problem of aliena-
tion.  Many students become smug in their lack of appreciation of what the business of
the school is and how it is connected with the world outside.
Id. at 96–97.
23. Id.
24. Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 77 (1979).  The Safe School Study by the Na-
tional Institute of Education, conducted in 1978, is one of the benchmark studies relating
school violence to dimensions of school climate:
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This anti-social conditioning is particularly detrimental to high school
age youth because adolescents are undergoing significant psychological,
intellectual, and emotional development.  Brain science and developmen-
tal psychology tell us that adolescent youth are in the process of develop-
ing their identities and understanding their place in society.25  During this
time, youth are being “hardwired,” shaped and programmed into patterns
of thought and behavior that impact the way they interact with the world
around them and determine what kind of adults they will become.26  As a
result, they have very fragile identities that make them particularly vul-
nerable to outside pressures and influences.27  During the teenage years,
children learn as much from their social interactions with peers and au-
Using questionnaires, data were collected from students, teachers, and principals from
642 U.S. public schools.  Community data from each school were prepared from the
1970 census.  The institute’s report clearly suggested that school administration and
policies make a significant difference in victimization rates.  Certain policies, the re-
port stated, reduced disorder in schools: decreasing the size and impersonality of
schools; making school discipline more systematic; decreasing arbitrariness and stu-
dent frustration; improving school reward structures; increasing the relevance of
schooling; and decreasing students’ sense of powerlessness and alienation.
In a reanalysis of the Safe School Study data, Gottfredson and Gottfredson (1985)
related student and teacher victimization to various factors internal and external to
schools.  Schools with the worst discipline problems were schools where the rules were
unclear, unfair, or inconsistently enforced; schools that used ambiguous or indirect
responses to student behavior (for example, lowered grades in response to miscon-
duct); schools where teachers and administrators did not know the rules or disagreed
on responses to student misconduct; schools that ignored misconduct; and schools
where students did not believe in the legitimacy of the rules.  Other major factors
related to high levels of victimization included school size; inadequate resources for
teaching; poor teacher-administration cooperation; inactive administrations; and puni-
tive attitudes on the part of teachers.
Wayne N. Welsh, The Effects of School Climate on School Disorder, 567 ANNALS OF THE
AM. ACAD. OF POL. & SOC. SCI. 88, 92–93 (2000).
25. Webster’s Dictionary defines adolescence as “the period of life from puberty to
maturity terminating legally at the age of majority.” MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE
DICTIONARY 17 (11th ed. 2003).  For the purposes of this Article, I use the term to refer to
young people between the ages of twelve and at least nineteen years of age.  Because the
developmental studies suggest that brain development is not complete until the early twen-
ties, there is an argument that, at least developmentally, adolescence continues past the
legal age of majority.
26. Sarah Spinks, Inside the Teenage Brain: Adolescent Brains Are Works in Progress,
Here’s Why, FRONTLINE, PBS.ORG, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/teen-
brain/work/adolescent.html (indicating that the period of “hardwiring” occurs during
adolescence).
27. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005) (discussing “outside pressures and
influences” that play a role in affecting adolescents’ development).
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thority figures as they do from textbooks.28  Therefore, the draconian dis-
ciplinary policies of America’s urban public schools, where children are
viewed with suspicion and treated like threats, create a self-fulfilling
prophecy—when students are treated as threats to society, they become
threats to society.29
This Article focuses on the search and seizure practices in America’s
public high schools and why such practices are developmentally inappro-
priate.  In Part II, I will examine and critique the current paradigm of
school search jurisprudence.  I discuss how the Court’s analysis largely
ignores age as a factor in determining the reasonableness of a search.
This Part also addresses the increased use of police officers to enforce
school discipline.  Drawing on neuroscience and developmental psychol-
ogy, Part III discusses the developmental needs of youth, particularly in
light of recent Supreme Court cases involving juveniles.  The Court’s en-
dorsement of recent research in the area of adolescent brain development
has important implications for school search jurisprudence because rea-
sonableness is an evolving standard that can accommodate multiple inter-
ests.  Part IV explores ways to strike a developmentally appropriate
balance between safety and privacy in the context of the educational en-
vironment.  In this Part, I discuss positive youth development and sociali-
zation, particularly as these concepts relate to notions of privacy,
autonomy, and the legitimation of the law.  I suggest a new paradigm for
school search and seizure, which I call a “positive youth development ap-
proach” to school searches.  Because of the special role public education
plays in the creation of republican citizens, any school search framework
should account for the realities of adolescent brain development and the
particular tension between vulnerability and responsibility that occur in
youth.  Students and society have a convergent interest in a public educa-
tion system that creates law-abiding citizens capable of making positive
contributions to society.  Therefore, when determining the reasonable-
ness of a school search, this interest should be included in the balance.
In the Conclusion, I suggest doctrinal and policy changes to how
schools conduct searches and seizures, which will help counter the trend
28. Spinks, supra note 26 (recognizing that “the brain is capable of growth well be-
yond the first few years of life,” and thus it should follow that adolescents are capable of
learning from a wide variety of sources, including peer interactions and textbooks).
29. UDI OFER ET AL., N.Y. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, SAFETY WITH DIGNITY: ALTER-
NATIVES TO THE OVER-POLICING OF SCHOOLS 21 (2009); Paul J. Hirschfeld, Preparing for
Prison?: The Criminalization of School Discipline in the USA, 12 THEORETICAL CRIMINOL-
OGY 79, 79 (2008); Miriam Rokeach and John Denvir, Front-Loading Due Process: A Dig-
nity-Based Approach to School Discipline, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 277, 294 (2006); Christina L.
Anderson, Comment, Double Jeopardy: The Modern Dilemma for Juvenile Justice, 152 U.
PA. L. REV. 1181, 1202 (2004).
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of increasing youth criminalization, by using the negative Fourth Amend-
ment right as a tool for democratic socialization and positive youth devel-
opment.  I argue that probable cause is a more developmentally
appropriate standard for searches that take place in schools, the training
ground of citizenship.  Probable cause is a clearly defined, workable stan-
dard that protects against arbitrariness and the perception of arbitrari-
ness.  Therefore, probable cause should be the unitary standard in school
searches.  I also suggest important implementation procedures that will
bolster the socialization function of these new Fourth Amendment rights
for students.  Finally, in recognition that, at least for now, the applicable
standard is reasonable suspicion, I examine how this standard can be im-
plemented in a way that will advance positive youth development in
school searches that are conducted by school officials.
II. THE POISONOUS PEDAGOGY OF NEW JERSEY V. T.L.O.
Back in the days, our parents used to take care of us.
Look at ‘em now, they even f***in’ scared of us.30
A. Suspicious Minds
The principal case in school search jurisprudence that created the cur-
rent standard of reasonable suspicion is a 1985 case involving the search
of a fourteen-year-old high school student’s purse: New Jersey v. T.L.O.31
A teacher found T.L.O. and another student smoking in a school bath-
room in violation of the school disciplinary code.32  The teacher sent
T.L.O. to the assistant principal’s office where T.L.O. denied smoking.33
The assistant principal then searched her purse and discovered a pack of
cigarettes and rolling papers.34  Suspecting that T.L.O.’s purse might con-
tain additional drug-related evidence, the assistant principal conducted a
more thorough search of the purse.35  This search uncovered “a small
amount of marihuana, a pipe, a number of empty plastic bags, a substan-
tial quantity of money in one-dollar bills, an index card that appeared to
be a list of students who owed T.L.O. money, and two letters that impli-
cated T.L.O. in marihuana dealing.”36  The assistant principal turned over
this evidence to the police and the state charged T.L.O. as a juvenile de-
30. NOTORIOUS B.I.G., Things Done Changed, on READY TO DIE (Bad Boy Records
1994).
31. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
32. Id. at 328.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 328.
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linquent.37  T.L.O. filed a motion to suppress, which was denied by the
juvenile court.38  The court of appeals upheld the denial which the New
Jersey Supreme Court reversed.39
In 1985, state and federal courts approached school searches in three
different ways.  In those days, the only public officials found in public
schools were teachers and administrators, so the question was whether
the Fourth Amendment applied to those officials at all.  Some states re-
garded school officials as beyond the Fourth Amendment’s reach because
they were private citizens acting in loco parentis.40  At the other end of
the spectrum were states that required school officials to have probable
cause before conducting in-school searches.41  However, a majority of
states took the middle ground, which was the approach taken by New
Jersey and ultimately adopted by the Supreme Court; under this ap-
proach, the Fourth Amendment applies to searches conducted by school
officials but “the special needs of the school environment require[d] as-
sessment of the legality of such searches against a standard less exacting
than that of probable cause.”42
Therefore, on certiorari, the Court found that while the Fourth
Amendment applies to school searches, probable cause is not required
because it “is not an irreducible requirement of a valid search.”43  Rea-
37. Id. at 328–29.
38. Id. at 329.
39. State ex rel. T.L.O. v. Engerud, 463 A.2d 934, 944 (N.J. 1983), rev’d, New Jersey v.
T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
40. E.g., T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 332 n.2 (citing D.R.C. v. State, 646 P.2d 252, 261 (Alaska
App. 1982)); In re Thomas G., 90 Cal .Rptr. 361, 365 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970); In re Donaldson,
75 Cal. Rptr. 220, 223 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969); R.M.C. v. State, 660 S.W.2d 552, 555 (Tex.
App.—San Antonio 1983, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Mercer v. State, 450 S.W.2d 715, 718 (Tex.
App.—Austin 1970, no writ)).
41. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 332 n.2 (citing State v. Mora, 307 So. 2d 317, 320 (La. 1975)).
The Court also cites cases in which the probable cause standard was applied to school
searches involving police or in which the school search was highly intrusive. Id. (citing M.
v. Bd. of Educ. Ball-Chatham Cmty, Unit Sch. Dist. No. 5, 429 F. Supp. 288, 292 (S.D. Ill.
1977); Picha v. Wielgos, 410 F. Supp. 1214, 1219–21 (N.D. Ill. 1976); State v. Young, 216
S.E.2d 586, 594 (Ga. 1975); M.M. v. Anker, 607 F.2d 588, 589 (2d Cir. 1979)).
42. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 332 n.2 (1985) (citing Tarter v. Raybuck, 742 F.2d 977, 988 (6th
Cir. 1984); Bilbrey v. Brown, 738 F.2d 1462, 1472 (9th Cir. 1984); Horton v. Goose Creek
Indep. Sch. Dist., 690 F.2d 470, 488 (5th Cir. 1982); Bellnier v. Lund, 438 F. Supp. 47, 55
(N.D.N.Y. 1977); M., 429 F. Supp. at 292; In re Christopher W., 105 Cal. Rptr. 775, 783
(Cal. Ct. App. 1973); State v. Baccino, 282 A.2d 869, 872 (Del. Super. Ct. 1971); State v.
D.T.W., 425 So. 2d 1383, 1388 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); Young, 216 S.E.2d at 594; In re
J.A., 406 N.E.2d 958, 963 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980); People v. Ward, 233 N.W.2d 180, 184 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1975); Doe v. State, 540 P.2d 827, 834–35 (N.M. Ct. App. 1975); People v. Scott
D., 315 N.E.2d 466, 471 (N.Y. 1974); State v. McKinnon, 558 P.2d 781, 785 (Wash. 1977); In
re L.L., 280 N.W.2d 343, 352 (Wis. Ct. App. 1979)).
43. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 340.
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sonableness is all the Fourth Amendment requires.44  To determine what
was reasonable in the context of a public school, the Court balanced the
students’ interest in privacy against the “substantial interest of teachers
and administrators in maintaining [school] discipline.”45  Although the
Court agreed that students have a legitimate expectation of privacy at
school, “the school setting requires some easing of the restrictions to
which searches by public authorities are ordinarily subject.”46  The Court
explained:
We join the majority of courts that have examined this issue in con-
cluding that the accommodation of the privacy interests of school-
children with the substantial need of teachers and administrators for
freedom to maintain order in the schools does not require strict ad-
herence to the requirement that searches be based on probable cause
to believe that the subject of the search has violated or is violating
the law.  Rather, the legality of a search of a student should depend
simply on the reasonableness, under all the circumstances, of the
search.47
And, just like that, probable cause was “jettisoned” in favor of reasonable
suspicion.48
T.L.O. is a significant turning point in Fourth Amendment jurispru-
dence because it was the first time the Court departed from the probable
cause standard for full-scale searches.49  If this had been a full-scale
search situation outside of school, prob able cause would have been the
necessary standard.  For example, if T.L.O. were an adult (or even a juve-
nile, for that matter) accused of violating a municipal smoking ban, prob-
able cause would be required before the government could conduct a
search of her purse.50  Although over the decades the Courts’ Fourth
44. Id. at 341.
45. Id. at 339.
46. Id. at 340.
47. Id. at 341.
48. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 357–58 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“The
Court’s decision jettisons the probable-cause standard—the only standard that finds sup-
port in the text of the Fourth Amendment—on the basis of its Rohrschach-like [sic] ‘bal-
ancing test.’”).
49. Id.  However, in the years after T.L.O., the Court expanded the use of the reason-
ableness-balancing test to other types of searches. See Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz,
496 U.S. 444, 455 (1990) (warrantless stops and examinations of all drivers passing through
a “sobriety checkpoint”); Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 880 (1987) (warrantless
searches of the homes of probationers); O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 728 (1987)
(warrantless searches of government employee’s office, desk, or file cabinets).
50. As of July 2010, over 3,000 U.S. cities had passed some form of smoking restric-
tion. AM. NON-SMOKER’S RIGHTS FOUND OVERVIEW LIST—HOW MANY SMOKE-FREE
LAWS?, 1 (2011), available at http://www.no-smoke.org/pdf/mediaordlist.pdf.  Some states
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Amendment jurisprudence has followed a long and winding road, the
general preference for searches pursuant to warrants justified by proba-
ble cause still exists.51  And while some would argue that the exceptions
to the warrant requirement have swallowed the rule, probable cause still
remains the sine-qua-non of reasonableness, even when a warrant is not
required.52
have even created criminal penalties. See, e.g., CALABASAS CAL. MUN. CODE §§ 8.12.030-
.040 (2006) (making violation of the non-smoking ordinance a misdemeanor); LEXINGTON-
FAYETTE CNTY. CODE OF ORDINANCES §§ 14.97-1049 (2003) (penalizing violators with
fines and criminal prosecution in certain cases; MINN. STAT. § 144.417 (making violation of
State Clean Indoor Air Act a petty misdemeanor).
51. Before the police could undertake a search of a person or their property or affect
an arrest, they had to have a warrant justified by probable cause.  Limited exception to the
warrant requirement was made on the basis of exigent circumstances. See United States v.
Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951) (warrant not required in “exceptional circumstances”);
United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 65–66 (1950) (holding that the Fourth Amend-
ment permits a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest).  During this time, the Fourth
Amendment right was grounded in property rights. See, e.g., Olmstead v. United States,
277 U.S. 438, 464 (1928) (asserting that the Fourth Amendment protections extend to ma-
terial things: “the person, the house, his papers or his effects”).  In the late 1960s, the Court
switched from a property analysis to a privacy analysis to resolve search and seizure cases.
See e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (stating that the reach of the Fourth
Amendment does not depend on a physical intrusion); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294,
301 (1967) (discussing the right to privacy as an element of Fourth Amendment cases).
Under a privacy analysis, the locus of the right bestowed by the Fourth Amendment is
individual privacy, which is deserving of constitutional protection if (1) a person exhibits an
actual subjective expectation of privacy and (2) this expectation is one that society recog-
nizes as reasonable. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).  Under this framework,
the Court created a hierarchy of privacy expectations: expectations that society is willing to
recognize receive full protection, diminished expectations of privacy receive minimal pro-
tection, and expectations of privacy that society is unwilling to recognize receive no protec-
tion.  Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 148–49 (1978) (holding that an automobile passenger
cannot challenge the legality of a vehicle’s search because they have no legitimate expecta-
tion of privacy in the passenger compartment of the vehicle).  The sliding scale of privacy
expectations paved the way for the abandonment of probable cause in some warrantless
searches because in the case of diminished privacy rights, reasonableness was all that was
required. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30–31 (1968) (creating a balancing test to deter-
mine the reasonableness of the search of a person, limited to a very brief detention with
only a cursory pat-down of the outer clothing of an individual for the purpose of checking
for weapons).
52. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 818–19 (1996) (holding that absent ex-
traordinary factors in how the search and seizure is conducted, searches and seizures are
presumed reasonable when police have probable cause).  There is much debate regarding
the “rule-swallowing” nature of exceptions to the warrant requirement. See, e.g., Scott E.
Sundby, A Return to Fourth Amendment Basics: Undoing the Mischief of Camara and
Terry, 72 MINN. L. REV. 383, 439–40 (1988) (arguing against a sliding-scale privacy in-
quiry); Julie Rikelman, Justifying Forcible DNA Testing Schemes Under the Special Needs
Exception to the Fourth Amendment: A Dangerous Precedent, 59 BAYLOR L. REV. 41, 67
(2007) (warning against the continued expansion of the special needs exception); Tracey
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Probable cause is presumed to be reasonable because it is the procedu-
ral safeguard upon which warrants rest, and a search pursuant to a war-
rant based on probable cause is the only kind of search explicitly
authorized by the Fourth Amendment.53  Probable cause is found to exist
where “‘the facts and circumstances within their [the officers’] knowledge
and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient
in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that’
an offense has been or is being committed.”54
Under this standard, using the previous example, if the individual sus-
pected of violating the smoking ban (let’s call her Tracy) is confronted by
police and denies the allegation, the inquiry ends.  As in the school set-
ting, it is generally the smoking, not the mere possession of cigarettes that
constitutes the offense.55  If the police want to go further and search
Tracy’s purse for evidence of a violation, they must have specific, trust-
worthy information that such evidence will be found there.  For example,
probable cause would exist if a reliable witness saw Tracy put the extin-
guished cigarette into her purse or this action was clearly captured on a
video surveillance camera.  Otherwise, there is no probable cause to
search her purse.  A mere suspicion, however reasonable, will not justify
such a “severe violation of subjective expectations of privacy.”56  Unlike
reasonable suspicion, probable cause requires more than a “common-
Maclin, Justice Thurgood Marshall: Taking, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 723, 797 (1992) (stating
that the consent exception has swallowed the rule requiring warrants before the search of a
home can be undertaken); Susan Klein, Civil In Rem Forfeiture and Double Jeopardy, 82
IOWA L. REV. 183, 274 n.65 (indicating that “the exceptions for exigent circumstances and
seizures incident to arrest swallow the rule”).
53. Tracey Maclin, When the Cure for the Fourth Amendment Is Worse than the Dis-
ease, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 20–21 (1994).
54. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175–76 (1949) (citing Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925)).  The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States guarantees:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
55. State ex rel. T.L.O. v. Engerud, 463 A.2d. 934, 943 (N.J. 1983), rev’d, New Jersey v.
T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985) (“Mere possession of cigarettes did not violate school rule or
policy, since the school allowed smoking in designated areas.  The contents of the handbag
had no direct bearing on the infraction.”).  The United States Supreme Court reasoned
that possession of cigarettes would be relevant evidence of a violation of the school rule in
question. T.L.O 469 U.S. at 345.  Therefore, since the assistant principal had a reasonable
suspicion that the purse would contain cigarettes, the search was justified. Id.
56. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 337–38.
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sense” suspicion.57  If, as in T.L.O., there is nothing beyond common
sense to connect the purse to the violation, Tracy’s “right to be left alone”
remains mostly intact, whereas T.L.O.’s has been severely violated.58
Under probable cause, the adult citizen is given the benefit of privacy,
whereas under reasonable suspicion, the student, a citizen-in-the-making,
is not.59
In fleshing out how the reasonable suspicion standard should be ap-
plied in the context of school searches, the Court drew on Terry v.
Ohio’s60 two-part reasonableness inquiry.61  Under Terry, a search is rea-
sonable if it is “justified at its inception” and “reasonably related in scope
to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.”62
Under this standard, the Court concluded that the search of T.L.O.’s
57. Id.  In T.L.O., the Court characterizes the assistant principal’s suspicion as “the
sort of ‘common-sense [conclusion] about human behavior’ upon which ‘practical peo-
ple’—including government officials—are entitled to rely.”  Id. at 346 (citing United States
v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981)).
58. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 346.  The makers of our Constitution:
[C]onferred, as against the Government, the right to be let alone - the most compre-
hensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.  To protect that right,
every unjustifiable intrusion by the Government upon the privacy of the individual,
whatever the means employed, must be deemed a violation of the Fourth
Amendment.
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
59. I do recognize that the Supreme Court also articulated a reasonable suspicion
standard for searches conducted by public employers on their employees in O’Conner v.
Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987).  However, for reasons mentioned in the introduction and fur-
ther discussed in Parts III and IV, high school age children are particularly susceptible to
their environment and the public school setting plays a critical role in socializing young
people into the laws and norms of our democratic republic.  The unique vulnerabilities of
youth in conjunction with the special legal socialization function of mandatory public edu-
cation distinguishes public school from public employment.  Public employees are, gener-
ally, adult citizens who have (presumably) already been socialized into civil society.
60. 392 U.S. 1 (1967).
61. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 342.  The majority cites Terry as precedent for the notion that
a search can be legal even if based reasonable suspicion.  However, the Court’s reliance on
Terry for this point is arguably misguided because as Justice Brennan explains in his dis-
sent, “[t]he line of cases begun by Terry . . .  provides no support” for a standard less than
probable cause when a full scale search is at issue. “for they applied a balancing test only in
the context of minimally intrusive searches that served crucial law enforcement interests.
The search in Terry itself, for instance, was a ‘limited search of the outer clothing.’” Id. at
360 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.
1, 30 (1968)).  The search of T.L.O was a full-scale search as are most school searches
today.
62. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20–21 (1967).  It is interesting to note that Terry was
intended to apply only to limited weapons searches for the safety of the officer. Id. at 26.
It expressly did not apply to searches for evidence, although, in many cases, school
searches are just that. Id. at 31.
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purse was reasonable.63  Because the search of T.L.O. was based on an
individualized suspicion, the Court did not address whether individual-
ized suspicion was required under the newly minted reasonableness stan-
dard for searches by school officials but hinted that it may not be.64
Individualized suspicion is a requirement of probable cause.65
The Court justified its departure from probable cause, in part, by ac-
knowledging the growing crisis of violence, weapons, drugs, and crime in
schools.66  Words like “safety,” “security,” “order,” and “misbehavior”
are repeated throughout the opinion.67  Juvenile crime was at its peak in
the 1980s, and the Court was clearly responding to the national fervor
over this issue.68  Writing for the majority, Justice White acknowledges
that “school disorder has often taken particularly ugly forms: drug use
and violent crime in the schools have become major social problems.”69
Justice Powell’s concurrence states: “[T]he school has the obligation to
protect pupils from mistreatment by other children, and also to protect
teachers themselves from violence by the few students whose conduct in
63. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341–24.
64. Id. at 342 n.8.  “In other contexts, however, we have held that although ‘some
quantum of individualized suspicion is usually a prerequisite to a constitutional search or
seizure[,] . . . the Fourth Amendment imposes no irreducible requirement of such suspi-
cion.’“ Id. (citing United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 560–61 (1976) quoting
Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967)).
65. See, e.g., Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91 (U.S. 1979) (“Where the standard is
probable cause, a search or seizure of a person must be supported by probable cause par-
ticularized with respect to that person.”).
66. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at  350 n.1.
67. See generally id.
68. JEFFREY BUTTS & JEREMY TRAVIS, URBAN INST.: JUSTICE POL’Y CTR., THE RISE
AND FALL OF AMERICAN YOUTH VIOLENCE: 1980 TO 2000, 2 (2002), available at http://
www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/410437.pdf.  “[J]uvenile arrests for Violent Index offenses
(i.e., murder, forcible rape, robbery, and aggravated assault) grew 64 percent between 1980
and 1994.  Juvenile arrests for murder jumped 99 percent during that time.” Id.  See also
Pierre Thomas, Virginia Weekly, Crime Hits a High in Summer, WASH. POST, June 29,
1989, at V1 (writing that the police attribute increased crime during the summer largely
due to idle juveniles); Peter Applebome, Juvenile Crime: The Offenders Are Younger and
the Offenses More Serious, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 1987, at A16 (“Juvenile justice officials say
that younger children are becoming involved more often in serious criminal activity usually
associated with older youths or adults.”); Tom Shales, TV Preview, The Youngest Killers,
WASH. POST, Sept. 3, 1981, at C1 (providing that, because of a lack of expectation from
society, kids “are willing to kill, and even be killed”); Bill Bryan, Teen Violence Soars:
Courts ‘In A Crisis’, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, July 9, 1989, at 1D (quoting a police ser-
geant as saying “There’s just more violence today with young people”); Davan Maharaj,
Juvenile Crime Rises in Shirley, Residents Decry Delinquency, Teens Say They’re ‘Hanging
Out’, NEWSDAY (N.Y.–Brookhaven ed.), June 29, 1988, at 35 (mentioning the difference
between what teenagers see as “hanging out,” and what others view as “loitering, which
sometimes results in incidents of violence and vandalism”).
69. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 339.
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recent years has prompted national concern.”70  The United States, in its
amicus curiae brief supporting a lower standard of suspicion in school
searches (which was cited by the Court), used empirical studies on school
violence to conclude that “many schools are in such a state of disorder
that not only is the educational atmosphere polluted, but the very safety
of students and teachers is imperiled.”71  Even Justice Brennan in his dis-
sent agrees that “we can take judicial notice of the serious problems of
drugs and violence that plague our schools.”72  With these concerns
weighing heavily on one side of the balance, student privacy concerns
were in serious peril.73
To some extent, T.L.O. was part of a broader trend in the narrowing of
Fourth Amendment rights in response to the “war on drugs,” a strategy
that has been largely unsuccessful, and much decried but fueled by a pow-
erful narrative that awakens deeply held, if often irrational, fears.74  Like
the narrative of the “war on drugs,” the narrative of the dangerous, po-
70. Id. at 350 (1985) (Powell, J., concurring).
71. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Reversal at 40–41,
T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (No. 83-712), 1984 WL 565546.  The brief states:
In 1978, the National Institute of Education (NIE), an agency of the Department of
Education, reported that each month in America’s secondary schools 282,000 students
were physically attacked; 112,000 students were robbed by means of force, weapons,
or threats; and 2,400,000 students had their personal property stolen.  NIE also re-
ported that almost 8% of urban junior and senior high school students missed at least
one day of school a month because they were afraid to go to school.
With respect to secondary school disorder affecting teachers, NIE reported that
each month 6,000 teachers were robbed; 1,000 teachers were assaulted seriously
enough to require medical attention; 125,000 teachers were threatened with physical
harm; and 125,000 teachers encountered at least one situation in which they were
afraid to confront misbehaving students.
Id. at 39–40.
72. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 357 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
73. See Martin R. Gardner, Student Privacy in the Wake of T.L.O.: An Appeal for an
Individualized Suspicion Requirement for Valid Searches and Seizures in the Schools, 22
GA. L. REV. 897, 920 (1988) (“[W]hat [the Court] giveth in applying the [F]ourth
[A]mendment to the schools, it perhaps taketh away by invoking the balancing ap-
proach.”); Betsy Levin, Educating Youth for Citizenship: The Conflict Between Authority
and Individual Rights in the Public School, 95 YALE L.J. 1647, 1669 (1986) (mentioning
how searches under the Fourth Amendment, when applied in a school context, “are con-
siderably relaxed when . . . conducted by school officials”).
74. See generally, e.g., Diane-Michele Krasnow, To Stop the Scourge: The Supreme
Court’s Approach to the War on Drugs, 19 AM. J. CRIM. L. 219 (1992); Scott E. Sundby, A
Return to Fourth Amendment Basics: Undoing the Mischief of Camera and Terry, 72 MINN.
L. REV. 383 (1988); Silas J. Wasserstrom, The Incredible Shrinking Fourth Amendment, 21
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 257 (1984); Steven Wisotsky, Crackdown: The Emerging “Drug Excep-
tion” to the Bill of Rights, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 889 (1987).  “In the history of human reaction
to irrational fear, drug interdiction policies are a classic example of Brandeis’ teaching:
‘Men feared witches and burnt women.’”  David Helfeld, Narcotics, Puerto Rico, Public
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tentially violent youngster roaming the halls of our public schools, ready
to shoot and kill “has features of what sociologists describe as a moral
panic, in which the media, politicians, and the public reinforce each other
in an escalating pattern of alarmed reaction to a perceived social
threat.”75  In the immediate wake of T.L.O., scholars and commentators
saw the writing on the wall with regard to the Fourth Amendment rights
of students and tried to suggest ways to limit its reach, but the holding
inevitably created a slippery slope that in the following years, the Court
slid down and fell off.76  The unanswered questions of T.L.O., including
the role of law enforcement, its applicability to blanket searches without
individualized suspicion (such as dog sniffs and metal detectors), and the
extent to which students have a legitimate expectation of privacy in desks,
lockers, and now cell phones, are not easily resolved.  Meanwhile, the
narrative of youth criminality as a serious threat to society remains a po-
tent theme in American culture and a driving force of public policy.77
Policy: In Search of Truth and Wisdom, 75 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 1029, 1049 (2006) (citing
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376 (1927)) (Brandeis, J., concurring)).
75. Elizabeth S. Scott & Laurence Steinberg, Blaming Youth, 81 TEX. L. REV. 799,
807 (2003).  The authors argue that:
The elements of a moral panic include an intense community concern (often triggered
by a publicized incident) that is focused on deviant behavior, an exaggerated percep-
tion of the seriousness of the threat and the number of offenders, and collective hostil-
ity toward the offenders, who are perceived as outsiders threatening the community.
Although the fervor typically fades in a relatively short time, panics can effectively
become institutionalized if legal and policy changes result.
Id.
76. See Irene Merker Rosenberg, New Jersey v. T.L.O.: Of Children and Smokes-
creens, 19 FAM. L.Q. 311, 329 (1985) (“[T]he decision may well have a spillover effect . . . .
It is therefore questionable whether the Court will be able to resist the inexorable pull of
the T.L.O. case.”).  Other scholars have written:
Although T.L.O. sidesteps the constitutionality of blanket school searches by reserv-
ing any opinion on whether individualized suspicion is an essential element of the
reasonableness requirement, the Court in other contexts has repeatedly stressed that
the Terry reasonable suspicion standard requires particularized suspicion.  There is no
reason why individualized suspicion should not also be extended to the school setting.
Myrna G. Baskin & Laura M. Thomas, Note, School Metal Detector Searches and the
Fourth Amendment: An Empirical Study, 19 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1037, 1054 (1986).  The
concern over issues left unanswered by T.L.O. (such as whether individualized suspicion is
required) became manifest as the Court used T.L.O. to justify suspicionless searches of all
students who participate in extracurricular activities and of student athletes.  Bd. of Educ.
of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, (2002); Vernonia School District 47J v.
Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 665 (1995).
77. Political figures still utilize the narrative of violent youth to support and justify
social control of young people. See Bob Von Sternberg, A Push to Try Preteens as Adults,
STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Feb. 11, 2011, at 1B (reporting on efforts by members of Min-
nesota’s House of Representatives to pass “Emily’s Law,” which would allow children as
young as ten years old to be tried as adults).  Culturally, whether violent “gangsta” rap
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However, what was kept at bay in 1985 continues to bubble below the
surface, as tensions between students and school officials continue to
brew.  Things came to a head in Safford Unified School District v. Red-
ding,78 a case in which thirteen-year-old honor student Savana Redding
was strip-searched on the basis of a tip by another student that she might
have ibuprofen on her person in violation of school policy.79  The Court
reasoned that the assistant principal did not have sufficient suspicion to
warrant a strip search, because the allegations against Savana did not in-
dicate that the drugs presented an immediate danger or that they were
concealed in her underwear.80  While Redding is a victory for student pri-
vacy because it sets a floor for violations under the reasonable suspicion
standard, it sets that floor at complete humiliation, which is not represen-
tative of most searches.81  Moreover, the Redding Court did find that the
assistant principal had sufficient suspicion to justify searching Savana’s
lyrics actually contribute to violent behavior has yet to be demonstrated with any conclu-
siveness. See, e.g., Jeanita W. Richardson & Kim A. Scott, Rap Music and Its Violent Prog-
eny: America’s Culture of Violence in Context, 71 J. OF NEGRO EDUC., 175, 183 (2002)
(providing evidence of a statistical link between violent lyrics and “the violent contexts
many of the lyricists chronicle”).  However, the thuggish image of masculinity promoted by
rap music is one of the dominant portrayals of Black youth in popular culture.  Violent
lyrics that glorify killing, drugs, and criminal behavior contribute to a perception that the
youth (Black or otherwise) who listen to this music are inherently dangerous.  At a Senate
Commerce Committee hearing in June of 1998, a teacher of thirteen-year-old Mitchell
Johnson, who was accused of gunning down classmates at school, told lawmakers that
Johnson was influenced by the violence portrayed in the rap music he played repeatedly
before the shooting.  Eun-Kyung Kim, Debate Over Rap Lyrics Continues, CBS NEWS,
June 17, 1998, available at http://www.cbsnews.com/2102-207_162-11983.html.  The senator
who called the hearing expressed concern that the music industry marketed the most vio-
lent music to teens. Id.  The hearings also targeted violent lyrics from shock rocker
Marilyn Manson, who appeals to White teens. Id.  As an example of the type of lyrics in
question, in Bone Thugs ‘N Harmony’s “Gangsta Attitude,” rapper Bizzy proclaims: “You
see no pistol’s in the holster—Watch the dot’s on your forehead—I’m gunnin’ while you’re
runnin—[a]nd there’s plenty of bloodshed—[t]here’s no sympathy over killin—I already
warned you—[y]ou crossed the path of a maniac—[s]o now you’re a goner.”  BONE THUGS
‘N HARMONY, Gangsta Attitude, on FACES OF DEATH (Bone Enterprise 1994).  In “Dispos-
able Teens,” Manson warns: “The more that you fear us the bigger we get the more that
you fear us the bigger we get and don’t be surprised, don’t be surprised don’t be surprised
when we destroy all of it.”  MARILYN MANSON, Disposable Teens, on HOLY WOOD (Inter-
scope Records 2000).
78. 557 U.S. __, 129 S. Ct. 2633 (2009).
79. Redding v. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1, 557 U.S. __, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2637
(2009).
80. Id.
81. As Judge Wardlaw said in writing for the majority of the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals, “[the strip search of a thirteen-year-old girl] is a violation of any known principle
of human dignity.”  Redding v. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1, 531 F.3d 1071, 1088 (9th
Cir. 2008).
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backpack and outer-clothing.82  There is language in Redding that ad-
dresses adolescent vulnerabilities and the corresponding importance of
personal privacy.83  However, as a practical matter, Redding does not al-
ter the basic framework of T.L.O., and thus its applicability to the aver-
age school search is limited: it does not prevent school officials from
conducting invasive searches of backpacks, purses, and outer-clothing on
little more than a glorified hunch.84
Although it does not alter the T.L.O. framework, Redding is illustra-
tive of the length to which schools will go to enforce school rules and
exemplifies the problem with the amorphous reasonable suspicion stan-
dard as it currently applies to school searches.  While it should “not re-
quire a constitutional scholar to conclude that a nude search of a
[thirteen]-year-old child is an invasion of constitutional rights” in the case
of Savana Redding, it took nine such scholars from the nation’s highest
Court to settle the matter.85  The problem is that reasonable suspicion
provides so much latitude for searching that school officials can construe
82. Redding, 557 U.S. at __, 129 S. Ct. at 2641 (2009).
83. Id.  Most notably, Justice Souter states that “[t]he reasonableness of [Savana’s]
expectation” of bodily privacy “is indicated by the consistent experiences of other young
people similarly searched, whose adolescent vulnerability intensifies the patent intrusive-
ness of the exposure.” Id. (citing Brief of Amici Curiae the Nat’l Assoc. of Soc. Workers et
al. at 6–7, Redding, (No. 08-479), 2009 WL 870022).  The brief that Justice Souter cites to
for this notes that “strip searches . . . can result in serious emotional damage.”  Irwin A.
Hyman & Donna C. Perone, The Other Side of School Violence: Educator Policies and
Practices that May Contribute to Student Misbehavior, 36 J. SCH. PSYCHOL. 7, 13 (1998).
84. Redding, 557 U.S. at __, 129 S. Ct. at 2645 (Stevens & Ginsburg, JJ., concurring in
part and dissenting in part); id. at 2647 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). The factors that contributed to the assistant principal’s initial suspicion of Savana
Redding were (1) an uncorroborated statement from a student who was found to have
ibuprofen pills in her pocket who claimed the pills came from Savana; (2) Savana’s associa-
tion with an “unusually rowdy group at the school’s opening dance”; and (3) an uncorrobo-
rated claim from another student that alcohol had been served a party at Savana’s house
the night of the dance. Id. at 2640–41.  Under a probable cause standard, unsubstantiated
self-serving claims and what is essentially an allegation of normal teenage behavior at a
school dance would not justify a search. Id. at 2639.
85. Doe v. Renfro, 531 F.2d.91, 92–93 (7th Cir, 1980); accord Redding, 557 U.S. at __,
129 S. Ct. at 2644 (Stevens & Ginsburg, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(citing Steven, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part in New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469
U.S. 325, 342 n.25 (1985)).  Justice Souter’s majority decision in Redding attempts to re-
move some of the ambiguity from the reasonable suspicion standard by stating that reason-
able suspicion requires “a moderate chance of finding evidence of wrongdoing.” Redding,
557 U.S. at __, 129 S. Ct. at 2639 (2009).  Justice Souter also attempts to flesh out how
reasonable suspicion should operate in school searches, describing a sliding scale that re-
quires a search to be justified by corresponding factual support. Id. at 2642.  For a more
thorough discussion on this aspect of Redding, see Lewis R. Katz & Carl. J. Mazzone,
Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, and the Future of School Strip Searches, 60
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 363 (2010).
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almost anything as reasonable.86  This problem is evidenced by the fact
that even though the Court found the strip search of Savana Redding
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, they extended sovereign im-
munity to the School Board because the prima facie unreasonableness of
the search was not clearly established by T.L.O. or any other precedent.87
The Court found that there were “numerous” and “well-reasoned” cases
that expressed a “disuniform view of the law” regarding strip searches.88
The diversity of opinion regarding strip searches is symptomatic of the
general state of the reasonable suspicion case law—in any given category,
behavior on either end of a spectrum can invite suspicion.89  “Behavior,
hearsay, seemingly innocent comments, and observations can all form le-
gitimate bases for action.”90
If anyone and anything can be viewed as suspicious, the exercise of
discretion becomes particularly susceptible to all kinds of bias, including
racial bias because determining what constitutes a reasonable suspicion is
based on a subjective interpretation of behavior.91  Potentially innocent
86. See Martin H. Belsky, Random vs. Suspicion-Based Drug Testing in the Public
Schools—A Surprising Civil Liberties Dilemma, 27 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 1, 19–21 (2002)
(listing twelve potential justifications for a school official to perform such searches under
the reasonable suspicion standard).
87. Redding, 557 U.S. at __, 129 S. Ct. at 2644.
88. Id.  “[T]he cases viewing school strip searches differently from the way we see
them are numerous enough, with well-reasoned majority and dissenting opinions, to coun-
sel doubt that we were sufficiently clear in the prior statement of law.  We conclude that
qualified immunity is warranted.” Id.
89. See Belsky, supra note 86 (discussing the arbitrary nature of strip search reasona-
bleness determinations).  Obviously, there can be other examples where any articulated
basis of suspicion will be accepted as reasonable.
90. Id.
91. See L. Song Richardson, Arrest Efficiency and the Fourth Amendment, 95 MINN. L.
REV. 2035, 2058–59 (2011) (indicating that the United States Supreme Court has offered
changes to improve poor policing and more effectively protect privacy against arbitrary
and often racially biased government intrusion).  As Professor Richardson explains in her
critique of the reasonable suspicion standard in stop-and-frisk encounters between citizens
and police:
Terry . . . allows officers to stop and frisk an individual based on their interpretation of
an individual’s ambiguous behavior . . .  The behavioral assumption underlying the
reasonable suspicion test is that a well-intentioned officer is capable of interpreting
identical behavior similarly, regardless of the race of the individual they are observing.
While this behavioral assumption is intuitively appealing, it does not withstand scien-
tific scrutiny.  Officers may [un]consciously use a more lenient standard when judging
the behavior of [W]hites versus [B]lacks . . . . [Un]conscious stereotype activation in
the presence of [B]lack individuals can cause officers to interpret ambiguous behav-
iors performed by [B]lacks as suspicious, aggressive, and dangerous while similar be-
havior engaged in by [W]hites would go unnoticed.
Id. at 2061–62.  Professor Richardson applies a behavioral realist framework to stop-and-
frisk Fourth Amendment doctrine. Id. at 2040.  She utilizes research in the field of implicit
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behavior can become a reasonable suspicion to search when “deep-
seated, perhaps unconscious, affections, fears, and aversions” affect deci-
sion-making.92  The cultural narrative of the dangerous young Black thug
distorts the perception of all urban adolescents.93  Therefore, like officers
on the street, school officials—no matter how well-meaning—are influ-
enced in their decision making process by race-based stereotypes about
students.94  While explicit bias is relatively easy to prove and clearly ille-
social cognition, which demonstrates how unconscious biases affect behavior, to argue that
the Terry standard, which was adopted by T.L.O., results in arbitrary, and thus, unreasona-
ble intrusions on privacy. Id. at 2059–60.  One of the doctrinal reforms she suggests is
discarding the reasonable suspicion standard in favor of probable cause. Id. at 2075–77.
92. RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME AND THE LAW 144–45 (1997).
93. The news media is a dominant purveyor of the narratives of youth, race and crime.
See Franklin D. Gilliam, Jr. & Shanto Iyengar, Prime Suspects: The Influence of Local
Television News on the Viewing Public, 44 AM. J. POL. SCI. 560, 563–65 (2000) (discussing a
study demonstrating how news media’s crime reporting can condition attitudes toward race
and crime).  Other scholars note:
There is abundant evidence suggesting that “mainstream America,” particularly
[W]hite mainstream America, associates (and has long associated) African[-]Ameri-
can and Latino male adolescents and young adults with violence, danger, and disorder.
There can be little doubt that this association, powerfully reinforced by continuous
coverage of the high profile assaults on children and exemplary ([W]hite) adults—
attacks the media attributed explicitly and exclusively to young Latinos and African[-
]American males—figured significantly in the creation of a more ominous category of
transgressing adolescent.
Paul Colomy & Laura Ross Greiner, Making Youth Violence Visible: The News Media And
the Summer of Violence, 77 DENV. U. L. REV. 671, 681 (2000).  Even when not racially
coded, youth violence is often sensationalized in the media. Compare Peter Slevin & Wil-
liam Claiborne, 1st Grader Shoots Classmate to Death; Pair Had Quarreled the Previous
Day, WASH. POST, Mar. 1, 2000, at A1 (featuring a story about a shooting by a six-year-old
who killed a victim on the front page), with Peter Slevin & Jaclyn Serson, Pa. Hostage-
Taker Surrenders After Fatal Shootings; 2 Dead, 3 Critically Wounded in Rampage, WASH.
POST, Mar. 2, 2000, at A2 (placing coverage of a hostage attack which took the lives of
more persons deeper in the paper).
94. Rowan L. Pigotta and Emory L. Cowen, Teacher Race, Child Race, Racial Con-
gruence, and Teacher Ratings of Children’s School Adjustment, 38 J. SCH. PSYCH. 177, 189
(2000) (studying teacher ratings of students’ behavior, competencies, and future educa-
tional prognosis based on race).  The study found that “African[-]American children were
judged by [Black and White] teacher groups to have more serious school adjustment
problems, fewer competencies, more negatively stereotypic personality qualities, and
poorer educational prognoses than White children.” Id.; see also Sophie Trawalter et al.,
Attending To Threat: Race-Based Patterns of Selective Attention, 44 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC.
PSYCHOL. 1322, 1326 (2008).  The paper goes on to explain that:
The stereotype of young Black men as criminal is deeply embedded in the collective
American consciousness (and unconscious). . . .  The present findings offer the sober-
ing suggestion that the association between young Black men and danger has become
so robust and ingrained in the minds of social perceivers that it affects early compo-
nents of attention.
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gal, implicit bias is almost impossible to prove and can impact discretion-
ary decisions to much the same effect.95  As a result, students of color are
more likely to be singled out for searches than their White counterparts.96
The effects of this kind of disparate treatment on adolescents will be dis-
cussed later, but the potential for biased decision making inherent in rea-
sonable suspicion is, in and of itself, a cause for concern.
Yet, the flexibility and discretion that reasonable suspicion provides is
exactly why it appeals to school administrators.97  Without some flexibil-
ity and discretion, how can school officials be expected to keep their cam-
puses safe?  In a post-Columbine world, officials need to make snap
decisions without having to navigate hyper-technical rules.98  Moreover,
the potential for abuse of the reasonable suspicion standard is mitigated
by the fact that teachers and administrators care for their students and
want them to succeed.  “[T]here is a commonality of interests between
teachers and their pupils.  The attitude of the typical teacher is one of
personal responsibility for the student’s welfare as well as for his educa-
tion.”99  Educators, unlike officers enforcing the criminal law, often
“enter the profession . . . for the chance to make a positive difference in
Id.
95. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996).  Although the Court in Whren
refused to consider the subjective motive of the law enforcement officers in making stops,
they acknowledged that “the Constitution prohibits the selective enforcement of the law
based on considerations such as race.” See also State v. Soto, 734 A.2d 350, 353 (N.J. Supp.
Ct. 1996) (using statistical evidence to support finding that State Police were stopping mi-
nority motorists solely on the basis of race).
96. See Tamar Lewin, Raid at High School Leads to Racial Divide, Not Drugs, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 9, 2003, at A20. (describing a drug raid at a racially-mixed school that appar-
ently targeted Black students).
97. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 17, Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Red-
ding, 557 U.S. __, 129 S. Ct. 2633 (2009) (No. 08-479), 2008 WL 4573923 (arguing that
anything more than reasonable suspicion “places student safety and school order at risk by
impairing the ability of school officials to effectively carry out their custodial responsibil-
ity”); Brief of Amicus Curiae Nat’l Sch. Bd. Assoc. & Am. Assoc. of Sch. Administrators in
Support of Petitioners at 3, Redding, 557 U.S. __, 129 S. Ct. 2633 (No. 08-479), 2008 WL
4906096 (“Deference to educators’ judgments recognizes that the role of the courts in
school administration should necessarily be limited in order to avoid placing unwise con-
straints on the ability of school officials to preserve the learning environment and protect
the safety of students.”); Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Rever-
sal, supra note 71, at 45 (supporting reasonable suspicion because “there is no need for the
judiciary to impose rigid constraints on school officials in their day-to-day work”).
98. See Brief for Petitioners on Writ of Certiorari, supra note 97, at 24 (asserting that
under a reasonable suspicion standard school officials “retain the flexibility to respond
swiftly to protect students and maintain order”).  For an explanation of Texas’s reaction to
juvenile offenders post-Columbine see Elizabeth A. Angelone, Comment, Texas Two-Step:
The Criminalization of Truancy under the Texas Failure to Attend Statute, 13 SCHOLAR 433,
446 (2011).
99. New Jersey v. T. L. O., 469 U.S. 325, 349–350 (U.S. 1985) (Powell, J., concurring).
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students’ lives, despite often limited pay, resources, and appreciation.”100
Requiring them to adhere to the rules of criminal procedure in their in-
teractions with students detracts from the informality of the student-
teacher relationship and potentially hinders their ability to react effec-
tively to dangerous situations.101
These important and valid concerns are addressed in greater detail in
Part IV below.  For now, suffice it to say that undoubtedly, maintaining
safety and orderliness is an important responsibility for schools today,
just as it was when T.L.O. was decided.  However, the reality in public
schools has changed significantly during the twenty-five years since that
decision.  The nexus between law enforcement and school officials has
become an important part of school disciplinary policy in a way that was
perhaps unforeseen in 1985.  The introduction of law enforcement into
the school disciplinary process affects all aspects of the school’s social
climate, including the “special relationship” between students and
teachers.
B. The Elephant in the Room
The Court in T.L.O. was careful not to discuss the standard required in
searches conducted by or in conjunction with police because the facts of
the case did not present this issue.102  Neither do any of T.L.O.’s progeny,
including Redding.103  Because of the Court’s continuing silence on this
issue, there is an elephant in the room that has grown over the years.104
100. Reply Brief for Petitioner at 11, Redding, 557 U.S. __, 129 S. Ct. 2633 (No. 08-
479), 2009 WL 1007123.
101. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Reversal, supra note 71,
at 14–15.
102. T.L.O. 469 U.S. at 342 n.7.
103. Redding, 557 U.S. at __, 129 S. Ct. at 2640; Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No.
92 v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 831, 833, 844 (2002); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S.
646, 664–65 (1995).  If T.L.O. created a proverbial slippery slope with regard to warrantless
searches in public schools, Vernonia and Earls slide down that slope and nearly fall off a
cliff. Vernonia allows for suspicion-less drug testing of student athletes and Earls allows
the same for all students involved in extracurricular activities.  It seemed that the next step
was for the Court to approve of suspicion-less searches conducted by drug-sniffing dogs.
There is currently a circuit split with regard to whether such searches violate student’s
Fourth Amendment rights, and the Court has thus far refused to settle the issue.  B.C. v.
Plumas Unified Sch. Dist., 192 F.3d 1260, 1269 (9th Cir. 1999); Horton v. Goose Creek
Indep. Sch. Dist., 690 F.2d 470, 488 (5th Cir. 1982); Doe v. Renfrow, 631 F.2d 91, 94 (7th
Cir. 1980).
104. Searches and seizures involving police at school is a rich area of litigation.
Courts are divided with regard to how school police should treat students vis-a´-vis the
Fourth Amendment.  Some have found that probable cause is required. In re A.J.M., 617
So. 2d 1137, 1138 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (“[W]here a law enforcement officer directs,
participates or acquiesces in a search conducted by school officials, the officer must have
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Now it is too big to ignore.105  Policing, or in certain instances, over-polic-
ing, has, in the view of some, replaced school safety as the major concern
in public education.106
probable cause for that search, even though the school officials acting alone are
treated . . . to a lesser constitutional standard.”); F.P. v. State, 528 So. 2d 1253, 1254 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (holding “that the ‘school official exception’ is not applicable under
the factual circumstances of this case”); State v. Tywayne H., 933 P.2d 251, 253, 254 (N.M.
Ct. App. 1997) (officers involved were not SROs, but had been hired by the school as
security at a school dance).  Most other courts have found that school police are authorized
to search students under the same standard as school officials. See  Shade v. City of Farm-
ington, 309 F.3d 1054, 1060 (8th Cir. 2002) (affording immunity to an officer that aided in a
search); People v. Dilworth, 661 N.E.2d 310, 318 (Ill. 1996) (applying reasonable suspicion
to school searches conducted by SROs); State v. Angelia D.B., 564 N.W.2d 682, 690 (Wis.
1997) (holding that the level of suspicion does not change when a school police officer
conducts a search); T.S. v. State, 863 N.E.2d 362, 379 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (finding that
SROs are school officials under T.L.O.); State v. N.G.B., 806 So. 2d 567, 568–69 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 2002) (permitting an officer to conduct a search because a school official author-
ized the officer’s assistance); J.A.R. v. State, 689 So. 2d 1242, 1244 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1997) (“If a school official has a reasonable suspicion that a student is carrying a dangerous
weapon on his or her person, that official may request any police officer to perform the
pat-down search for weapons without fear” of Fourth Amendment violations or probable
cause requirements); In re Josue T., 989 P.2d 431, 439 (N.M. Ct. App. 1999) (allowing an
officer to search a student on school grounds, so long as the search is reasonable).  In a
third approach, the Tennessee Supreme Court found that the applicable standard depends
on the role and function of the SRO within the school.  R.D.S. v. State, 245 S.W.3d 356, 369
(Tenn. 2008).
105. For example:
[T]he National Association of School Resource Officers (NASRO), serves as an exam-
ple of the growth in the number of school police officials.  Although NASRO is a
relatively young organization, having been formed in 1991, in a decade and a half
NASRO built a roster of more than 15,000 members.
As to estimates of the number of school police officers in the United States, analy-
ses of Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics (LEMAS) data
show that more than a third of all sheriffs’ offices and almost half of all local police
departments have assigned sworn officers to serve in schools, with a total of more than
17,000 officers serving in schools, and that public school districts employ more than
3,200 sworn officers.
Ben Brown, Understanding and Assessing School Police Officers: A Conceptual and Meth-
odological Comment, 34 J. OF CRIM. JUSTICE 591–604 (2006).
106. N.Y. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, CRIMINALIZING THE CLASSROOM: THE OVER-PO-
LICING OF NEW YORK CITY SCHOOLS 4 (2007), available at http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/
racialjustice/overpolicingschools_20070318.pdf (documenting the rise of police in New
York City’s public schools and its negative impact on students); Norberto Valdez et al.,
Police in Schools: The Struggle for Student and Parent Rights, 78 DENV. U. L. REV. 1063,
1064 (2001) (providing a case study of the police practices in Northern Colorado schools
and specific examples of “high schoolchildren being questioned by the [law enforcement]
officers without another adult present and without notification of parents”); Marian
Wright Edelman, The Growing Problem of Over-Policing Our Schools, CHILDREN’S DEF.
2011] COUNTERING CRIMINALIZATION 325
The influx of law enforcement into public school can be attributed in
part to the national fervor over school violence that motivated the T.L.O.
Court to strip students of full Fourth Amendment protection in the first
place, and in part to a well-meaning but over-zealous response to highly-
publicized acts of violence committed at schools around the country in
the past decade.107  Police officers who are placed into public schools are
referred to as School Resource Officers or SROs, and although they have
been utilized in public schools since 1953108 the use of police in schools
has been steadily on the rise for approximately the last fifteen years.109
On their Facebook page the National Association of School Resource Of-
ficers describe school policing as the “fastest growing” area of law en-
forcement.110  In 2005, nearly seventy percent of public school students,
ages twelve through eighteen, reported that police officers or security
guards patrol their hallways.111  The U.S. Department of Education re-
ports that police are a daily presence in over half of the public high
schools in the nation.112
The Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 was
amended in 1998 to encourage the use of school resources officers.  The
text of the Bill defines a school resource officer (SRO) as:
[A] career law enforcement officer, with sworn authority, deployed
in community-oriented policing, and assigned by the employing po-
FUND (Mar. 2, 2009), http://www.childrensdefense.org/newsroom/child-watch-colums/child-
watch-documents/growing-problem-over-policing-our-schools.html.
107. The late 1990’s saw a rash of high-profile school shootings: Pearl, Mississippi;
West Paducah, Kentucky; Jonesboro, Arkansas; Edinboro, Pennsylvania; Springfield, Ore-
gon; Richmond, Virginia; and most memorably, Littleton, Colorado. JENNY REESE,
SCHOOL SHOOTINGS OF THE 1990S: COLUMBINE AND OTHER SCHOOLS AFFECTED BY GUN
VIOLENCE 3–13 (2010); Kenneth S. Trump, School Violence and Crisis 98: Lessons
Learned, NATIONAL SCHOOL SAFTEY AND SECURITIES SERVICES, http://www.schoolsecur-
ity.org/news/summer98.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2011).  There were twenty-five deaths
from school shootings in the 1996–97 school year and forty deaths in the 1997–98 school
year. REESE, supra, at 339.  The massacre at Columbine High School in Littleton left fif-
teen dead in one day in 1999. Id. at 3.
108. Connie Mulqueen, School Resource Officers More Than Security Guards, 71 AM.
SCH. & UNIV., July 1999, at SS17.  The first SRO was in Flint, Michigan, in 1953. Id.
109. Johanna Wals & Lisa Thurau, First, Do No Harm, How Educators and Police
Can Work Together More Effectively to Preserve School Safety and Protect Vulnerable Stu-
dents, CHARLES HAMILTON HOUSTON INST. FOR RACE & JUST., March 2010, at 1, available
at http://charleshamiltonhouston.org/assets/documents/news/FINAL%20Do%20No%20
Harm.pdf.
110. National Assoc. of School Resource Officers (NASRO), FACEBOOK, http://
www.facebook.com/home.php?filter=LF#!/NASRO.org?sk=info (last visited Nov. 5, 2011).
111. RACHEL DINKS ET AL., NAT’L CENTER FOR EDUC. STAT., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC.,
INDICATORS OF SCHOOL CRIME & STATISTICS: 2007, at 60 (2008).
112. Id. at 61.
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lice department or agency to work in collaboration with schools and
community-based organizations . . . to address crime and disorder
problems, gangs, and drug activities affecting or occurring in or
around an elementary or secondary school.113
Ideally, SROs are available to help provide leadership examples for all
students on campus.114  Police intervention into public education is often
viewed as a way to improve the relationship between students and the
police.115  Under the “triad” model adopted by many school resource of-
ficer programs, SROs are expected to do more than just enforce the law:
they also teach and mentor students.116
In these roles, police not only maintain discipline but secure students’
social boundaries.117  “An analysis of police programs in schools reveals
that police officers function simultaneously as security officers, risk edu-
cators, informant-system operators, and counsellors, and that they mobil-
ize students and staff to play these roles as well.”118  School resource
officers are in the school every day and are part of the school community.
They know who the “good kids” and “bad kids” are and they try to pro-
tect the entire school from those “bad kids.”  “[The] main purpose [of
having police officers in school] is to develop rapport with the students so
that students trust them enough to either inform them about other class-
mates planning violent incidences or turn to SROs for help when they
themselves are in trouble.”119  This image of the friendly, trustworthy po-
113. Pub. L. No. 105-302, 112 Stat. 2841 (1998) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3796 dd-8).
The statute further continues that SRO’s should work:
[T]o develop or expand crime prevention efforts for students; to educate likely school-
age victims in crime prevention and safety; to develop or expand community justice
initiatives for students; to train students in conflict resolution, restorative justice, and
crime awareness; to assist in the identification of physical changes in the environment
that may reduce crime in or around the school; and to assist in developing school
policy that addresses crime and to recommend procedural changes.
Id. at 2841–42.
114. See KAREN HESS & HENRY WROBLESKI, POLICE OPERATIONS 528 (2d ed. 1997)
(“The police department’s school resource officers (SROs) are the front-line intervention
specialists who unite efforts among the school district, the community, and the police de-
partment to maintain order.”).
115. Id.
116. PETER FINN ET AL., NAT’L INST. OF JUST., COMPARISON OF PROGRAM ACTIVI-
TIES AND LESSONS LEARNED AMONG 19 SCHOOL RESOURCE OFFICER PROGRAMS 1
(2005).
117. Id.  However, because the level of crime and disorder in a particular school will
dictate how much time an SRO can dedicate to the various roles, SROs in inner city
schools will spend most of their time doing law enforcement and very little time teaching
or mentoring. Id.
118. RICHARD ERICSON & KEVIN HAGGERTY, POLICING THE RISK SOCIETY 8 (1997).
119. Mulqueen, supra note 108.
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lice officer that can identify and prevent disciplinary infractions before
they happen is appealing but perhaps a bit too idyllic to ring true in the
most turbulent schools.  Here, where the brute forces of marginalization
wreak havoc in all aspects of the community, police are viewed with ex-
treme distrust.120  Children in these schools already have adversarial rela-
tionships with law enforcement, which is only exacerbated by their
presence in the school.
Thus, the influence of police in the schools can have an impact that
extends beyond the good intentions of advocates of SRO programs be-
cause the presence of these officers shapes the school social climate and
students’ legal socialization.121  In T.L.O., Justice Powell justified the low-
ered standard in school searches by recognizing the following:
The special relationship between teacher and student also distin-
guishes the setting within which schoolchildren operate.  Law en-
forcement officers function as adversaries of criminal suspects.
These officers have the responsibility to investigate criminal activity,
to locate and arrest those who violate our laws, and to facilitate the
charging and bringing of such persons to trial.  Rarely does this type
of relationship exist between school authorities and pupils.122
By incorporating police into schools, the line between school official and
law enforcement officer is blurred and the special relationship between
students and teachers deteriorates into one that is increasingly adver-
sarial.123  Using police as the school disciplinarians allow schools to rely
on “these officers to help them enforce control, even for non-violent and
otherwise routine student mischief.”124  This is evidenced by the increas-
120. ANDERSON, supra note 22, at 34.  “The police . . . are most often viewed as repre-
senting the dominant [W]hite society and as not caring to protect inner-city residents.” Id.
121. See Aaron Kupchik & Nicole L. Bracy, To Protect, Serve and Mentor?  Police
Officers in Public Schools, in SCHOOLS UNDER SURVEILLANCE: CULTURES OF CONTROL IN
PUBLIC EDUCATION 21, 22 (Torin Monahan & Rodolfo Torres eds., 2009) (highlighting the
“potential advantages and disadvantages of placing police in public schools”); Laura A.
Rosenbury, Between Home and School, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 833, 839 (2007) (discussing the
importance of school as an important site for the socialization of children).
122. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 349–50 (1985) (Powell, J., concurring).
123. See Gerald Grant, The Character of Education and the Education of Character,
DAEDALUS, Summer 1981, at 141 (noting the “adversarial and legalistic character of urban
public schools”).
124. Sean McCollum, Policing Our Schools, TEACHING TOLERANCE (Mar. 7, 2010),
http://www.tolerance.org/blog/policing-our-schools. See also S.C. DEP’T OF JUVENILE JUS-
TICE, ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT 2007-2008 13 (2009) (recognizing that in South Caro-
lina, the single most common offense resulting in juvenile court referral during the
2007–2008 school year was “Disturbing School.”).
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ing number of school-based arrests for minor incidents in recent years.125
Increasing the number of school-based arrests changes the nature of
school discipline because crime then becomes the prism through which
students are viewed and the criminalization of youth “becomes the most
valued strategy in mediating the relationship between educators and
students.”126
Because of the close nexus between school administrators and law en-
forcement, the “hallways of our nation’s public schools” have become
portals to “the revolving door of the criminal justice system.”127  School
police take advantage of the lowered standard of suspicion by conducting
searches of students and their belongings in conjunction with school offi-
cials.128  Other jurisdictions allow school resource officers to search stu-
125. See, e.g., ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, EDUCATION ON LOCKDOWN: THE SCHOOL-
HOUSE TO JAILHOUSE TRACK 15 (2005) (noting growth in the number of school-based
arrests in select jurisdictions); CHILDREN’S DEF. FUND, AMERICA’S CRADLE TO PRISON
PIPELINE 125 (2007) (finding a tripling in the number of school-based arrests in Miami-
Dade County from 1999–2001); Paul J. Hirschfield, Preparing for Prison? The Criminaliza-
tion of School Discipline in the USA, 12 THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY 79, 80 (2008) (assert-
ing that “problems that once invoked the idea and apparatus of school discipline have
increasingly become criminalized”); Daveen Rae Kurutz, School Arrests, Citations Jump by
46 Percent, PITTSBURGH TRIB. REV., Aug. 23, 2008 (documenting a forty-six percent in-
crease in the number of school-based arrests and citations in Allegheny County in a single
year).
126. Henry Giroux, Brutalizing Kids: Painful Lessons in the Pedagogy of School Vio-
lence , FOURWINDS10.COM, (Oct. 8, 2009), http://www.truthwinds.com/siterun_data/health/
abuse/news.php?q=1255196823.
127. Michael Pinard, From the Classroom to the Courtroom: Reassessing Fourth
Amendment Standards in Public School Searches Involving Law Enforcement Authorities,
45 ARIZ. L. REV. 1067, 1108 (2003).
128. E.g., Police Search Avondale Students, WDIV LOCAL 4 (last updated Mar. 15,
2010), http://www.clickondetroit.com/education/22838815/detail.html (describing a search
at a high school where the Michigan State Police and Auburn Hills Police Department
assisted school personnel in checking students’ backpacks and other belongings). See also
Cason v. Cook, 810 F.2d 188, 192 (8th Cir. 1987) (applying the reasonable suspicion stan-
dard where a school official and a school resource officer searched a student  in response to
a report of theft); Vassallo v. Lando, 591 F. Supp. 2d 172, 193–94 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (con-
cluding that the reasonable suspicion standard applied to a search of a student conducted
by high school authorities aided by law enforcement agents); In re L.A., 21 P.3d 952,
960–61 (Kan. 2001) that because “[t]he statutory function of a school security officer is to
protect school district property and the students, teachers, and other employees on the
premises of the school district,” officers can search students under the reasonable suspicion
standard and are not required to issue Miranda warnings); In re Angelia D.B., 564 N.W.2d
682, 689–90 (Wis. 1997) (holding that reasonable suspicion applies to searches by school
resources officers when they conduct them “in conjunction with school officials and in
furtherance of the school’s objective to maintain a safe and proper educational environ-
ment”); In re K.S., 108 Cal. Rptr. 3d 32, 37 (Cal. Ct. App. 4th 2010), modified, 2010 Cal,
App, LEXIS 557 (Cal. Ct. App. 1st 2010) (holding that reasonable suspicion was the ap-
propriate standard when a school official, accompanied by the police, searched a student’s
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dents under the reasonable suspicion standard even when they are acting
on their own authority.129  The Supreme Court of Kansas determined that
school resource officers do not qualify as officials because they are “not
employed by an entity whose primary responsibility is law enforce-
ment.”130  However, regardless of who employs them and whether they
are officially labeled school resource officers or not, police officers as-
signed to schools are law enforcement officers.  As the Tennessee Su-
preme Court recognized, “[s]chool officials and law enforcement officers
play fundamentally different roles in our society.”131  In spite of all the
talk about teaching and mentoring students, when the going gets tough
most SRO’s are going to fall back “on doing what they were trained to do
and [what they] know how to do—enforce the law.”132  When they de-
tain, question, and arrest those who violate school rules they “function as
adversaries” of the students.133  They collect evidence that can be used
against students in courts of law and along the way, students are trans-
formed into criminals.  When such evidence is obtained through a search
justified by a reasonable suspicion, students get the worst of both worlds:
clothing based on a tip provided by a police detective because the police never explicitly
requested the search be done); People v. Alexander B., 270 Cal. Rptr. 342, 343–44 (Cal. Ct.
App. 3d 1990) (finding that reasonable suspicion applies to searches if the investigation is
initiated by a school official); J.A.R. v. State, 689 So. 2d 1242, 1244 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1997) (applying the reasonable suspicion to a search conducted by school resource officer
who was informed that a child carried a gun to school).  It should be noted, however, that
courts do require probable cause where outside police officers initiate a search or where
school officials act at the behest of law enforcement officers not associated with the school.
R.D.S. v. State, 245 S.W.3d 356, 369 (Tenn. 2008) (recognizing that traditional law enforce-
ment officers must have probable cause to search students); F.P. v. State, 528 So. 2d 1253,
1254 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (applying probable cause to a search performed by a school
resource officer at the behest of a law officer unassigned to the school system); In re Josue
T., 989 P. 2d 431, 437 (N.M. Ct. App. 1999) (pronouncing that reasonable suspicion is the
appropriate standard for searches conducted by school resource officers because such of-
ficers are acting as “the arm of the school official”); State v. Tywayne H., 933 P.2d 251, 254
(N.M. Ct. App. 1997) (applying probable cause where search of student was “conducted
completely at the discretion of the police officers”); In re of Thomas B.D, 486 S.E.2d 498,
500 (S.C. Ct. App. 1997) (requiring probable cause when police conducted a search in
furtherance of law enforcement objective, rather than on behalf of school).
129. See, e.g., People v. Dilworth, 661 N.E.2d 310, 317 (Ill. 1996) (holding that a search
of a student by a public school “liaison police officer” was permissible); In re S.F., 607 A.2d
793, 794 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (applying the reasonable suspicion standard to a search con-
ducted by a plainclothes police officer for the school district). But see A.J.M. v. State, 617
So. 2d 1137, 1138 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (ruling that a school resource officer must have
probable cause to conduct a search).
130. In re L.A., 21 P.3d at 960–61.
131. R.D.S., 245 S.W.3d at 368.
132. FINN ET AL., supra note 116, at 13.
133. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 349 (1985) (Powell, J., concurring) (refer-
encing the role of law enforcement generally as being adversarial).
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they face the full panoply of sanctions and punishments under the juve-
nile or criminal justice systems, but without the constitutional protections
that normally adhere to such proceedings.
C. Les Lec¸ons Dangereuses134
Schoolchildren are criminalized in other ways as well.  Metal detectors
greet them as they enter the building.135  Once inside, they are not only
under the watchful eye of uniformed and armed SROs but also under
constant video surveillance.136  Schools conduct random sweeps for con-
traband.137  Dogs are brought to school, sniffing for drugs.138  And draco-
134. Translated this means the dangerous lessons. Les Lec¸ons Dangereuses is also the
French name of a 2004 made for television movie, Fatal Lessons: The Good Teacher.
Dangerous Lessons: The Movie, NOTRECINEMA.COM, http://www.notrecinema.com/
communaute/v1_detail_film.php3?lefilm=32759 (last visited Nov. 5, 2011).
135. Indicators of School Crime and Safety: 2008 - Indicator 20: Safety and Security
Measures Taken by Public Schools, INST. OF EDUC. SCI., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., http://
nces.ed.gov/programs/crimeindicators/crimeindicators2008/ind_20.asp [hereinafter Indica-
tors of School Crime].  Metal detectors and other security devices in schools are designed
to “monitor or restrict students’ and visitors’ behavior on campus.” Id.
136. Between the 1999–2000 and 2005–06 school years, the percentage of schools us-
ing one or more security cameras to monitor the school increased from [nineteen] to [forty-
three] percent. Id.  See generally ELORA MUKHERJEE, CRIMINALIZING THE CLASSROOM:
THE OVER-POLICING OF NEW YORK CITY PUBLIC SCHOOLS, N.Y. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION
(2007), available at http://www.nyclu.org/pdfs/criminalizing_the_classroom_report.pdf (as-
serting that “[New York] City schools feel more like juvenile detention facilities than learn-
ing environments”); Jen Weiss, “Eyes on Me Regardless”: Youth Responses to High School
Surveillance, 21 EDUC. FOUND. 47 (2007) (discussing students’ thoughts on video surveil-
lance and security in schools); Dominique Braggs, Webcams in Classrooms: How Far is
Too Far?, 33 J.L. & EDUC. 275, 276 (2004) (“By the 1999–2000 school year, [fifteen per-
cent] of public schools nationwide reported using some form of video surveillance.”);
ACLU Protests Cameras in Colorado Schools, ACLU, Jan. 25, 2001, available at http://
www.aclu.org/Privacy/Privacy.cfm?ID=6962&c=130 (noting that proposed surveillance
cameras for the Boulder [Colorado] Valley School District would cost up to $840,000);
Press Release, ACLU, ACLU Asks Arizona School District to Reject Face-Recognition
Checkpoints (Dec. 17, 2003), available at http://www.aclu.org/news/newsprint.cfm?ID=
14598&c=253 (providing that a face-recognition system is being installed to identify sex
offenders and missing children who visit the school); Graeme Zielinski & Christine B.
Whelan, Fauquier to Use Cameras to Keep Eye on Students, WASH. POST, Aug. 6, 2000, at
B1 (reporting the installation of $60,000 worth of cameras in Fauquier County, Virginia
schools “even though there has been no serious violence at [district schools] in recent
years”).
137. Indicators of School Crime, supra note 135.
138. Id.  Sixty-one percent of high schools reported performing random checks for
drugs using dogs. Id.  See, e.g., Candice Williams & Santiago Esparza, Grosse Pointe
School Searched for Drugs, DETROIT NEWS Apr. 29, 2010, at A8 (reporting that drug para-
phernalia was found during a surprise lock-down and sweep of an area high school in
which nine police dogs were used); Allison Manning, Rockland High Searched for Drugs
and Guns; One Student Fined for Having Marijuana, PATRIOTLEDGER.COM (Quincy,
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nian zero-tolerance policies subject violators to harsh punishments such
as suspension or expulsion regardless of the circumstances.139  In con-
junction with the lowered expectations of privacy embodied in the rea-
sonable suspicion standard, such policies foster an authoritarian
environment that is more like a prison than a place of learning and where
the lessons that are learned are ones of fear and control.140  “‘Schools are
where children learn their role in society.  Now children are learning that
they should always expect to have police around, and they can’t necessa-
rily expect fairness.’”141
As Justice Steven points out in his dissent in T.L.O.:
The schoolroom is the first opportunity most citizens have to experi-
ence the power of government.  Through it passes every citizen and
public official, from schoolteachers to policemen and prison guards.
The values they learn there, they take with them in life.  One of our
most cherished ideals is the one contained in the Fourth Amend-
ment: that the government may not intrude on the personal privacy
of its citizens without a warrant or compelling circumstance.  The
Mass.) Mar. 18, 2010, http://www.patriotledger.com/news/cops_and_courts/x1514354744/
Rockland-High-searched-for-drugs-and-guns-one-student-fined-for-having-marijuana. (re-
porting that a sweep for drugs and guns involving sixteen police dogs resulted in one dis-
covery of a small quantity of marijuana); Nate Schwerber, Drug Sniffing Dogs Patrol More
Schools, N.Y. TIMES Mar. 20, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/22/nyregion/long-is-
land/22Rsniff.html (reporting on a presentation in which the abilities of drug-sniffing dogs
were demonstrated to students); Christian Nolan, Parents Raise Stink Over Drug-Sniffing
Dogs; But State Court Rules That School Sweeps are Not Unconstitutional, CONNECTICUT
LAW TRIBUNE, Oct. 9, 2009, at 6 (discussing the ruling which found that using dogs to
conduct sweeps for drugs in lockers and cars was not unconstitutional); Ruth Teichroeb,
Stanford Examining High School Drug Bust, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER Jan. 22, 1998,
at B2 (reporting that a school district was considering using dogs to sniff for drugs follow-
ing the on-campus arrest of a student with $1000 worth of crack cocaine); Letter, Jay A.
Miller, Dogs in Schools Provide Poor Lesson, CHI. TRIB. May 10, 1990, at C24 (noting that
dogs falsely alerted to a student who had recently played with her own dog and to female
students who were menstruating; based on the false positive, the students were strip
searched); Colin Gustafson, Police With Drug-Sniffing Dogs to Patrol GHS, STAMFORD
ADVOCATE (Conn.) Jan. 22, 2010, http://www.stamfordadvocate.com/news/article/Police-
with-drug-sniffing-dogs-to-patrol-GHS-332820.php (noting that searches with police dogs
would continue because “this [the school] is a zero-tolerance environment”).
139. Henry Giroux, Mis/Education and Zero Tolerance: Disposable Youth and the
Politics of Domestic Militarization, BOUNDARY 2, Fall 2001, at 61, 89. “Zero tolerance laws
make it easier to expel students then for school administrators to work with parents, com-
munity justice programs, religious organizations, and social service agencies.  Moreover,
automatic expulsion policies do “little to produce a safer school . . . .” Id. at 87
140. Id. (noting that “most of the high-profile zero-tolerance cases . . . often involve
African-American students”). Id. at 87.
141. Polly Schullman, Responding to Violence in Schools, SCIENCE CAREERS May 4,
2007 (quoting sociologist Aaron Kupchik).
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Court’s decision today is a curious moral for the Nation’s youth.  Al-
though the search of T. L. O.’s purse does not trouble today’s major-
ity, I submit that we are not dealing with “matters relatively trivial to
the welfare of the Nation.  There are village tyrants as well as village
Hampdens, but none who acts under color of law is beyond reach of
the Constitution.”142
The concern that Justice Stevens voices in his dissent is even more
pressing in light of the expanding role of law enforcement officers and
other tools of control utilized by public schools that result in the criminal-
ization of students.  The lowered standard for searches set forth by
T.L.O. and reiterated by its progeny reduces constitutional freedoms of
the individual to an empty guarantee.  Reasonable suspicion exacerbates
the “conflict between establishing an environment for the transmission of
democratic values and the mixed message sent to the nation’s youth that
order and discipline are given more emphasis than their individual
rights.”143  For public school students, the government not only intrudes
on their personal privacy without a warrant or compelling circumstance,
but does so with the sanction of the very institutions that are charged with
the responsibility of “awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing
him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally
to his environment.”144  A student can be taught a lesson about the
Fourth Amendment’s protections against search and seizure in the morn-
ing, forced to submit to a search in the afternoon, and charged with a
crime resulting from that search the following day.145  Disciplinary re-
gimes that fail to value or adequately recognize a student’s autonomy and
individual liberty “strangle the free mind at its source” by “teach[ing]
142. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 385 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting
West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943)).
143. Traci B. Edwards, Note, Shedding Their Rights at the Schoolhouse Gate: Recent
Supreme Court Cases Have Severely Restricted the Constitutional Rights Available to Public
School Children, 14 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 97, 98–99 (1989).  “The goal of public educa-
tion is to instill democratic values while maintaining order and discipline.  But in protecting
that goal, courts send undemocratic signals to school students when they limit the constitu-
tional protections available to them.” Id. at 99.
144. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (finding that “where the state has
undertaken to provide [education, it] is a right which must be made available to all on
equal terms”).
145. However, following No Child Left Behind, forty-four percent of school districts
report reducing time spent on classes such as social studies.  Jennifer McMurrer, Choices,
Changes, and Challenges; Curriculum and Instruction in the NCLB Era, CENTER ON EDUC.
POL’Y, Dec. 2007, at 3.
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youth to discount important principles of our government as mere
platitudes.”146
Instead of nurturing, protecting, and educating children, public schools
are teaching youth three dangerous lessons when we strip them of the full
protection afforded by the Fourth Amendment.  First, compromising no-
tions of freedom and personhood contained in the Constitution erode its
normative significance and leads to a belief that the “cherished ideal” of
the Fourth Amendment is either meaningless or illusory.  This teaches
students that they are somehow unworthy or undeserving of its full pro-
tection.  For socially and economically disadvantaged students (who are
more likely to attend large, inner-city schools where police presence is
high and security measures are harsh) this lesson is particularly harmful
because it perpetuates the social expectations that have marginalized
their communities for decades.
Second, creating second-class rights creates second-class citizens with
lowered expectations of privacy.  “An encounter pursuant to an expan-
sive school search policy or statute is likely to impress upon a student that
he or she is inherently untrustworthy or that people who have authority
may wield it without regard to individual liberties.”147  Without a sound
understanding of such a basic percept of American democracy, such indi-
viduals are less capable of knowing when their rights have been violated
or resisting a violation before it happens, even when they leave the school
setting.  Thus, they are ill prepared for citizenship but well prepared for
penal institutions where only minimal individual rights are afforded.
“Schools cannot expect their students to learn the lessons of good citizen-
ship when the school authorities themselves disregard the fundamental
principles underpinning our constitutional freedoms.”148
Third, children who are subjected to school searches may feel that the
law is unfair as applied to them because adults in positions of authority
have treated them with distrust and disrespect.  In turn, youth develop
negative views of school and distrust of law enforcement that alienates
them from mainstream society, increasing the lure of counter-culture
ideas (such as gangs and other anti-social groups).  As Justice Powell
stated in T.L.O.:
Schools are places where we inculcate the values essential to the
meaningful exercise of rights and responsibilities by a self-governing
146. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 637.  The Court held that students in public schools could
not be forced to salute the American flag nor recite the Pledge of Allegiance. Id. at 642.
147. Bates McIntyre, Note, Empowering Schools to Search: The Effect of Growing
Drug and Violence Concerns on American Schools, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 1025, 1049 (2000).
148. Doe v. Renfrow, 451 U.S. 1022, 1027–28 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari).
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citizenry.  If the Nation’s Students can be convicted through the use
of arbitrary methods destructive of personal liberty, they cannot help
but feel that they have been dealt with unfairly.149
This causes a crisis of legitimacy under which the rule of law, which is
viewed as unjust, is disregarded in favor or street codes of honor, respect,
and loyalty.
Subjecting young people to the humiliation of seemingly arbitrary
searches—while at school—chips away at their dignity and self-respect.150
“State-operated schools may not operate as enclaves of totalitarianism
where students are searched at the caprice of school offi-
cials . . . [s]tudents look to teachers, school administrators, and others in
positions of authority as models for their own behavior and development
into responsible adults.”151  Reasonable suspicion, increased presence of
law enforcement, and other disciplinary policies that criminalize adoles-
cent behavior transforms schools into places where students are treated
like threatening figures that must be carefully regulated in order to main-
tain safety and order.  Youth are given very little room to engage in con-
duct that is normal and developmentally appropriate, such as
experimenting with different identities, risk-taking, and challenging
adults or persons of authority.152  Instead, they are expected to conform
to unrealistic behavioral objectives or face harsh consequences.153
Students who are searched under a reasonable suspicion standard may
face suspension, expulsion, or even a referral to juvenile or criminal court
as a result of the search.154  Perhaps even worse is the shame, humiliation,
149. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 373–74 (1985) (Powell, J., concurring).
150. See, e.g., Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An An-
swer to Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 974 (1964) (describing how intrusion may
harm human dignity); Note, Formalism, Legal Realism and Constitutionally Protected Pri-
vacy Under the Fourth & Fifth Amendments, 90 HARV. L. REV. 945, 987 (1977) (“The right
to privacy [in the Fourth Amendment] deserves primary recognition . . . because of its close
connection with the uniqueness of the person and human dignity.”).
151. Jones v. Latexo Indep. School Dist., 499 F. Supp. 223, 236, 239 (E.D. Tex. 1980).
152. See Jeffery Fagan, Context and Culpability in Adolescent Crime, 6 VA. J. SOC.
POL’Y & L. 507, 516 (1999) (describing the developmental processes of adolescence).
153. DANIEL J. LOSEN & RUSSELL J. SKIBA, S. POVERTY LAW CENTER, SUSPENDED
EDUCATION: URBAN MIDDLE SCHOOLS IN CRISIS 2, 9 (2010) (demonstrating that “[s]ince
the early 1970s, out-of-school suspension rates have escalated dramatically”).  This is due:
In part, the higher use of out-of-school suspension reflects the growth of policies such
as “zero tolerance,” an approach to school discipline that imposes removal from
school for a broad array of school code violations - from violent behavior to truancy
and dress code violations,” and explaining that most suspensions result from “non-
violent, less disruptive offenses,” such as using offensive language, cutting class, tardi-
ness, truancy, disobedience, disrespect, and “general classroom disruption.”
154. Id. There is little empirical evidence regarding the number of suspension, expul-
sions, and referrals to juvenile court that are based on evidence recovered during non-
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and loss of dignity that a student may feel regardless of the outcome of
the search.155  The expectation that students can “shed their constitu-
tional rights . . . at the schoolhouse gate” without suffering negative de-
velopmental outcomes is unrealistic.156  It does not account for the
specific developmental context of adolescence and the important role of
school as a socializing institution.
D. How Age Gets Lost in the T.L.O. Inquiry
Not only is high school an important time because “[t]he schoolroom is
the first opportunity most citizens have to experience the power of gov-
ernment,” but also because the teenage years are crucial to the
psychosocial, cognitive and neurological development of human be-
ings.157  The lessons that are being taught by watered-down constitutional
rights and authoritarian security measures are all the more dangerous be-
cause of the unique vulnerabilities of the adolescent mind.  While this is
discussed further below, it is important to note here that age is an impor-
tant factor for reasons that are based in science and are gaining recogni-
tion in constitutional jurisprudence.
The T.L.O. Court itself explicitly cites age as a factor in determining
the reasonableness of a search.  As discussed above, the reasonableness
of a school search is determined by the two-prong Terry inquiry.  The
Court states:
[A] search of a student by a teacher or other school official will be
“justified at its inception” when there are reasonable grounds for
suspecting that the search will turn up evidence that the student has
violated or is violating either the law or the rules of the school.  Such
a search will be permissible in its scope when the measures adopted
are reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not exces-
consensual searches of students. But see, id. at 24 n.1 (stating that most incidents involving
students bringing drugs, a weapon, or anything that would pose a threat to students usually
results in expulsion).
155. Randall R. Beger, The “Worst of Both Worlds”: School Security and the Disap-
pearing Fourth Amendment Rights of Students, 28 CRIM. JUST. REV. 336, 340 (2003) (docu-
menting studies suggesting that intrusive school searches “produce alienation and mistrust
among students . . . disrupt the learning environment and create an adversarial relationship
between school officials and students . . . [and] may actually interfere with student
learning”).
156. Tinker vs. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969) (indicat-
ing that given the “special characteristics of the school environment,” constitutional pro-
tections such as the First Amendment “are available to teachers and students”).
157. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 385 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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sively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and the
nature of the infraction.158
The requirement that school searches not be “excessively intrusive in
light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction,”159
is a small, but important addition to Terry’s two-part inquiry.
Terry does not require police to consider whether a search is exces-
sively intrusive in light of the age (or sex, for that matter) of the sus-
pect.160  This language indicates the Court was aware that there is
something different about schoolchildren, and that age plays a role in this
difference.  However, the Court does not elaborate on this or give any
guidance as to how the age component should be factored into the rea-
sonableness determination.In fact, it is never mentioned again in the
opinion.
None of the school search cases following T.L.O. elucidate on how or
why age should be accounted for when determining the permissible scope
of a search.161  The cases involving suspicionless drug testing of students
do not even raise the issue.  In these cases, the Court finds the character
of the intrusion is “negligible” and “minimal,” thus obviating further dis-
cussion of the permissible scope.162 Redding does inject age back into the
discussion, acknowledging that “adolescent vulnerability intensifies the
exposure’s patent intrusiveness.”163  However, as in T.L.O. there is no
meaningful discussion of age as a factor.  Why should the age of a student
even be considered?  Is the age limitation placed on the permissible scope
of a search related to students’ privacy or liberty interests?  Should con-
stitutional protections increase or decrease as the student gets older?
158. Id. at 342 (emphasis added).
159. Id.
160. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968).  In determining the validity of a search, a
court considers “whether the officer’s action was justified at its inception, and whether it
was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the
first place.” Id.
161. E.g., Safford Unified Sch. Dist. #1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. __, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2644
(2009) (holding that the strip search of a thirteen-year-old student was unreasonable and a
violation of the Fourth Amendment); Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawat-
omie Cnty v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002) (holding public high school policy of suspicionless
drug testing of students participating in extracurricular activities was reasonable and did
not violate the Fourth Amendment); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 665
(1995) (holding the school district’s suspicionless drug testing program of student athletes
was reasonable and, therefore, constitutional under the Fourth Amendment).
162. Acton, 515 U.S. at 658.  “Under such conditions, the privacy interests compro-
mised by the process of obtaining the urine sample are in our view negligible.” Id.  “Given
the minimally intrusive nature of the sample collection and the limited uses to which the
test results are put, we conclude that the invasion of students’ privacy is not significant.”
Earls, 536 U.S. at 834.
163. Redding, 557 U.S., at __, 129 S. Ct. at 2636.
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The Court cites to a brief by the National Association of Social Work-
ers (NASW), the substance of the brief explains why age is an important
factor to consider when determining the reasonableness of a search and
called for a new “framework to analyze . . . reasonableness,” but it was
not incorporated into the Court’s discussion or analysis.164  Thus, while
the Redding Court had the opportunity to reexamine the T.L.O. frame-
work it chose not to.  Nevertheless, although the balance between the
state’s interest in school safety and the students’ privacy interest remains
unchanged, at least the Court does reiterate that age is a factor when
determining the permissible scope of a search.165
Even though Redding involves a search that is deemed “categorically
distinct” from searches of “outer clothing and belongings,”166 hopefully
the age-based developmental distinctions raised by the NASW amicus
brief will resurface in future school search cases considered by the Court,
meriting a more meaningful analysis of age as a factor.  In Part III below,
I explore these developmental differences by first examining the scientific
research and then focusing on how the Supreme Court has incorporated
this research into its constitutional jurisprudence.  This discussion lays the
groundwork for the first part of my ultimate inquiry: whether a different
framework for analyzing the reasonableness of school searches is more
developmentally appropriate.  After considering the science of adolescent
brain development I will turn to the role of public education in advancing
positive youth development and democratic socialization through in-
creased privacy rights for students.
164. Brief for Nat’l. Assn. Soc. Workers et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respon-
dent at 5, Redding, 557 U.S. __, 129 S. Ct. 2633 (No. 08-479), 2009 WL 870022 (recognizing
the difference in development between children and youth from adults, therefore requiring
different treatment).  The brief states:
“[C]hildren are not just short adults . . . children and youth are developmentally differ-
ent from adults and must be treated appropriately.”  Here, those developmental dif-
ferences require not only a different framework to analyze the reasonableness of
Fourth Amendment searches, but also a clear understanding of the effects of exces-
sively intrusive searches on children and youth.
Id. (internal citation omitted).  See Redding, 557 U.S. at __, 129 S. Ct. at 2641 (holding that
the principal had reasonable suspicion, however his suspicion did not justify a strip search).
165. Id. at 2642 (citing New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985)).  The court
writes:
[T]he rule of reasonableness as stated in T.L.O., [requires that] “the search as actually
conducted [be] reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the
interference in the first place.” . . .  The scope will be permissible . . . when it is “not
exceedingly intrusive in light of the age . . . of the student and the nature of the
infraction.”
Id.
166. Id. at 2641.
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III. YOUTH DEVELOPMENT AND THE LAW: WE’RE NOT IN
JERSEY ANYMORE
Caterpillar: “Who are YOU?”
Alice: This was not an encouraging opening for a conversation.
“I—I hardly know, sir, just at present—at least I know who I was
when I got up this morning, but I think I must have been
changed several times since then.”167
The law has both embraced and rejected the concept of adolescence as
a unique developmental phase requiring a separate theoretical approach
for adolescents and adults.  The creation of a separate system of juvenile
justice exemplifies a recognition that adolescents are developmentally
different than adults and must be treated accordingly.168  The wave of
state legislation in the 1990s that “abandoned or reduced the traditional
discretionary-waiver authority of juvenile courts” represents an opposing
view that teenagers are not only dangerous and violent but also responsi-
ble enough to be punished in a manner similar to adult offenders.169
Rather than science, both approaches have been undergirded by
“[c]ommon sense and casual observation” which, regardless of the ap-
proach, there is justification to enforce protectionist policies aimed at reg-
ulating adolescent behavior.170
More recently, the paternalistic lens through which children, including
adolescents, have been viewed by the law is shifting into a paradigm of
increased autonomy, rights, and dignity for youth.171  The developmental
167. LEWIS CARROLL, ALICE’S ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND, AND THROUGH THE
LOOKING GLASS 38 (Lothrop Publ’g Co. 1898).
168. Terry A. Maroney, The False Promise of Adolescent Brain Science in Juvenile
Justice, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 89, 95 (2009).  “Theories of adolescence as a develop-
mental stage importantly distinct from both childhood and adulthood always have been
central to juvenile justice, underlying not only the core idea—that of having a separate
system at all—but also the attributes of that system.” Id.
169. See Gregory A. Loken & David Rosettenstein, The Juvenile Justice Counter-
Reformation: Children and Adolescents as Adult Criminals, 18 quinnipiac l. rev. 351, 352,
362 (1999) (noting the reformation in the juvenile justice system from being “essentially a
child welfare system” to one that is now structured with a “punitive character”). See also,
Emily Ray, Comment, Waiver, Certification, and Transfer of Juveniles to Adult Court: Lim-
iting Transfer in Texas, 13 SCHOLAR 317, 319 (2011) (arguing that “[t]ransfer . . . is not only
detnmental to the minor . . . but harmful to sociey as a whole”).
170. Kim Taylor-Thompson, States of Mind/States of Development, 14 STAN. L. &
POL’Y REV. 143, 146–48 (2003); see also Annette Appell, The Pre-Political Child of Child
Centered Jurisprudence, 46 HOUS. L. REV. 703, 709 (2009) (discussing how the legal regula-
tion of childhood is shaped by developmental aspects of the category of childhood such as
poor decision making skills, impulsivity, and vulnerability).
171. See generally Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, U.N. Docs.
A/44/736, at 5, A/44/736/CORR.1 (Nov. 20, 1989), available at http://documents-dds-
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differences between adolescents and adults, once based in common sense,
are now documented by behavioral and criminological research.172  There
is a consensus among researchers that the transition to adulthood is a
time of profound growth, change and development.173  The attributes of
youth, which once led policy makers to restrict rights, have become the
basis for an expansion of rights in certain areas.174  In particular, constitu-
tional protections that are predicated on “evolving standards” have been
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N89/292/45/img/N8929245.pdf?OpenElement. (setting out
the political, economic, civil, social, cultural, and health rights of children).  “Considering
that the child should be fully prepared to live an individual life in society, and brought up
in the spirit of the ideals proclaimed in the Charter of the United Nations, and in particular
in the spirit of peace, dignity, tolerance, freedom, equality and solidarity.” Id.  See also
Martin Guggenheim, Ratify the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child, But Don’t
Expect Any Miracles, 20 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 43, 44–45 (2006) (discussing the benefits of
the convention).  Guggenheim asserts that:
American children possess an abundance of rights.  The largest number and kinds of
rights they possess are statutory in nature and commonly enacted by state and local
legislatures.  But even if we focus solely on rights recognized by the Supreme Court of
the United States, children enjoy almost all of the rights that adults are guaranteed by
the Constitution.
Id.
172. See, e.g., Mary Beckman, Crime, Culpability and the Adolescent Brain, 305 SCI.
596, 596–99 (2004) (discussing the capacity for adolescents to commit crimes, and noting
that structurally the brain is still maturing during adolescence); L.P. Spear, The Adolescent
Brain and Age-Related Behavioral Manifestations, 24 NEUROSCIENCE & BIOBEHAVIORAL
REVIEWS 417, 417 (2000) (analyzing the different maturational changes in the brain of
adolescent that contribute to their behavioral characteristics including an increase in incli-
nation to use drugs); Laurence Steinberg, Cognitive and Affective Development in Adoles-
cence, 9 TRENDS IN COGNITIVE SCI. 69, 69–74 (2005) (analyzing adolescent behaviors
under new knowledge of brain developments).
173. See, e.g., Jay Giedd et al., Brain Development During Childhood and Adoles-
cence: A Longitudinal MRI Study, 2 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 861, 861 (1999) [hereinafter
Brain Development] (illustrating the results of an MRI study that analyzed different types
of brain matter); T. Paus et al., Maturation of White Matter in the Human Brain: A Review
of Magnetic Resonance Studies, 54 BRAIN RESONANCE BULL. 255, 255 (2001) (explaining
that “age-related changes in white matter continue during childhood and adolescence”);
Elizabeth R. Sowell et al., Mapping Continued Brain Growth and Gray Matter Density
Reduction in Dorsal Frontal Cortex: Inverse Relationships During Postadolescent Brain
Maturation, 21 J. OF NEUROSCIENCE 8819, 8819 (2001) (explaining that MRI’s of brain
maturation during adolescence show that there are subtle increases in both brain volume
and white matter at that time).
174. See generally Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 553 (2005) (holding that the
Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment extends to prohibit the death
penalty for crimes which are committed when an individual is under eighteen years old);
Graham v, Florida, 560 U.S. __, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2034 (2010) (holding that the Eighth
Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment prohibits imposing a sentence of life
without parole on juvenile offenders who did not commit homicide).  Additionally, the
Court stated that States must give juvenile non-homicide offenders who are sentenced to
life without parole a chance to obtain release. Id.
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adjusted to better account for developmental psychology and the science
of adolescent brain development. Roper v. Simmons175 and Graham v.
Florida176 are two recent Supreme Court cases that have advanced the
constitutional rights of children under the Eight Amendment through a
new appreciation of the vulnerabilities associated with adolescence due to
structural and functional differences in the brain that influence behav-
ior.177  Even more recently, the Court has recognized that age informs the
Fifth Amendment analysis of what constitutes custody under Miranda in
J.D.B. v. North Carolina.178
Similar to the Eighth Amendment, the Fourth Amendment’s reasona-
bleness requirement is an evolving standard that has changed over time
to conform to societal norms.179  Can the cognitive, psychosocial, and
neurological vulnerabilities demonstrated through scientific research and
recognized by the Court in Simmons and Graham be incorporated into
the constitutional framework for school searches?  Should age inform the
Fourth Amendment reasonableness analysis like it informs the Fifth
Amendment custody analysis?  The Part below looks at the science and
the case law which is the foundation for the subsequent discussion regard-
ing a developmental approach to school searches.
The Supreme Court’s reliance on adolescent brain development studies
and developmental psychology in connection with the Eighth Amend-
ment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment has generated con-
siderable scholarship in the area of juvenile justice.180  Other scholars
have explored the impact of adolescent brain development on the Fifth
Amendment rights of juveniles.181  Much of the scholarship focuses on
175. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
176. 560 U.S. __, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010).
177. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551; Graham, 560 U.S. at __, 130 S. Ct. at 2026.
178. See J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2399 (2011) (holding
that “a child’s age properly informs the Miranda custody analysis”).
179. See FLORIDA V. RILEY, 488 U.S. 445, 454–55 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring)
(acknowledging the fluid nature of the reasonable expectation of privacy depends on what
“society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable’”) (quoting KATZ V. UNITED STATES, 389
U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
180. See generally ELIZABETH S. SCOTT & LAURENCE STEINBERG, RETHINKING JUVE-
NILE JUSTICE 28–60 (2008) (discussing how crime involvement by teenagers is related to
adolescent development).
181. See, e.g., Tamar R. Birckhead, The Age of the Child: Interrogating Juveniles After
Roper v. Simmons, 65 WASH & LEE L. REV. 385, 397 (2008) (explaining that adolescents
lack the same maturity as adults); Barry C. Feld, Juveniles’ Competence to Exercise Mi-
randa Rights: An Empirical Study of Policy and Practice, 91 MINN. L. REV. 26, 74 (2006)
(asserting that adolescents typically are more inclined to waive their rights because they
think it is a more natural course of action); Ellen Marrus, Can I Talk Now?: Why Miranda
Does Not Offer Adolescents Adequate Protections, 79 TEMP. L. REV. 515, 516 (2006) (ex-
plaining that the differences in development between children and adults should entitle
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the competence and culpability of juveniles in the context of criminal law
or criminal procedure.  However, neuroscience and psychology may have
limited application in these areas because of “equality and autonomy
concerns” to which “no adequate limiting principle has yet been
articulated.”182
In the context of the Fourth Amendment, the primary concern is not
competence or culpability, but susceptibility.183  If, as the science sug-
gests, the human brain is being hardwired during adolescence, to what
extent can students’ individual liberties be encroached upon by the gov-
ernment without sacrificing positive youth development?184  Therefore,
instead of militating against individual autonomy, a Fourth Amendment
framework that is developmentally appropriate would actually afford ad-
olescents greater autonomy and equality by freeing them from unjust sus-
picion and arbitrary interference with their privacy.  Moreover, while
most scholars argue that adolescents should be treated differently than
adults, in regards to the Fourth Amendment adolescents should be
treated at least as equally as adults.  This approach does not posit that
adolescents should have rights co-extensive to adults because they are the
same as adults.  Rather, recognizing the developmental uniqueness of ad-
olescents dictates the consideration of factors beyond privacy and school
safety when applying the Fourth Amendment to high school students.
them to more constitutional protection); Christine S. Scott-Hayward, Explaining Juvenile
False Confessions: Adolescent Development and Police Interrogation, 31 LAW & PSYCHOL.
REV. 53, 62 (2007) (explaining how adolescents tend to be more immature than adults and
that is explained by both cognitive and psychological development).
182. Maroney, supra note 168, at 118.
183. See Diana R. Donahoe, Strip Searches of Students: Addressing the Undressing of
Children in Schools and Redressing the Fourth Amendment Violations, 75 MO. L. REV.
1123, 1160 (2010) (describing the susceptibility of students to unreasonable searches and
seizure under the current reasonable suspicions standard in school searches); see also N.G.
v. Connecticut, 382 F.3d 225, 239 (2d Cir. 2004) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (expressing
concern regarding the strip searches of two female juveniles because “youth ‘is a time and
condition of life when a person may be most susceptible to influence and to psychological
damage’”) (quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115 (1982)); Jonathan M. Ettman,
Vernonia Case Comment: High School Students Lose Their Rights When They Don Their
Uniforms, 13 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 625, 639 (1997) (stating that since students are not
afforded the same Fourth Amendment protection as adults, they are “more susceptible to
intrusive measures”).
184. See Spinks, supra note 26 (discussing the way teens’ brains develop).
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A. The Science
i. The Old
Conventional wisdom has always recognized that adolescence is a tur-
bulent time.185  Teenagers are notoriously moody, immature, and prone
to risk taking.186  Despite this, until recently, most neuroscientists be-
lieved that the human brain underwent the most significant changes very
early in life, during early childhood.187  Studies of brain tissues from
younger individuals showed that newborns had synaptic densities equal to
that of adults, and that density steadily increased during the first two
years of life until it was fifty percent greater than that of adults.188  It was
believed that the synaptic density then decreased between ages two and
sixteen, and remained largely constant from age sixteen to seventy-
two.189  Similarly, it was believed that neuronal density was very high in
newborns, declining steeply during the first six months of life, and then
continuing to decline throughout infancy and childhood.190  These results
led researchers to conclude that the brain was fully grown by age seven,
185. Eddings, 455 U.S. at 115 n.11.  “[A]dolescents . . . are more vulnerable, more
impulsive, and less self-disciplined than adults.” Id.
186. COALITION FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE, WHAT ARE THE IMPLICATIONS OF ADOLES-
CENT BRAIN DEVELOPMENT FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE 3 (2006), available at http://
www.juvjustice.org/media/resources/public/resource_138.pdf.
187. See Jay D. Aronson, Brain Imaging, Culpability and the Juvenile Death Penalty,
13 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 115, 119 (2007) (explaining that “[f]or most of the 20th
century, experts believed that the most important period for human brain development
was the first 3 years of a person’s life”); Catherine Sebastian, The Second Decade: What
Can We Do About the Adolescent Brain?, OPTICON1826, Spring 2007, at 1, available at
http://www.ucl.ac.uk/opticon1826/archive/issue2/VfPLIFE_Teenagers.pdf (discussing how
both white and grey matter continue to develop into early adulthood).
188. See Patricia S. Goldman-Rakic et al., Synaptic Substrate of Cognitive Develop-
ment: Synaptogenesis in the Prefrontal Cortex of the Nonhuman Primate, in DEVELOPMENT
OF THE PREFRONTAL CORTEX: EVOLUTION, NEUROBIOLOGY, AND BEHAVIOR 27 (1997)
(explaining that usually, nerve cells are not in direct physical contact).  There are micro-
scopic gaps between nerve cells called synapses.  Id.  Communication between nerve cells
takes place across synapses. Id. “The synaptic architecture of the cerebral cortex defines
the limits of intellectual capacity, and the formation of appropriate synapses is the ultimate
step in establishing these functional limits.” Id.
189. Kevin W. Saunders, A Disconnect Between Law and Neuroscience: Modern Brain
Science, Media Influences and Juvenile Justice, 2005 UTAH L. REV. 695, 704–05 (2005) (cit-
ing Peter R. Huttenlocher, Synaptic Density in Human Frontal Cortex— Developmental
Changes and Effects of Aging, 163 BRAIN RES. 195, 203 (1979)).  See generally Sharon
Begley, Your Child’s Brain, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 19, 1996, at 54 (summarizing brain develop-
ment research supporting the view that the most significant stages of brain development
occurred between birth and three years of age).
190. See NEUROBIOLOGY OF MENTAL ILLNESS 300 (Dennis S. Charney & Eric J. Nes-
tler eds., 2d ed. 2004) (explaining that neuronal density refers to the ratio between nerve
cells and other non-nerve cells in the human brain).
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and the fact that synaptic density was still higher than in the adult brain
meant that from age seven on, synapses would gradually be lost through a
process of pruning, by which unused or nonfunctioning synapses would
degenerate.191  Under this theory, teenagers were, at least developmen-
tally, identical to adults.
ii. The New
Before developments in technology, research was limited to studying
teenage brains post mortem.192  Even when MRI technology made it pos-
sible for researchers to analyze the brains of living individuals, lingering
concerns over the safety of exposing younger subjects to MRIs meant
that it wasn’t until the 1990s when the NIH approved such studies that
data could be collected in younger children.193  When these studies were
finally performed, they revealed that although the pruning process did
occur in childhood, there was also a secondary period of rapid develop-
ment around puberty, with gradual pruning occurring through adoles-
cence and into young adulthood.194
In particular, the research showed that there are increases in cortical
gray matter195 during the preadolescent years, with a subsequent de-
191. Saunders, supra note 189 (referencing a study conducted by Peter R. Hut-
tenlocher, in which he examined the brain tissue of twenty-one normal human beings vary-
ing in age, from newborns to those ninety years old).
192. Interview by PBS Frontline with Kurt Fischer, Director, Harvard’s Mind, Brain
& Education Program, Inside the Teenage Brain: How Much Do We Know About the
Brain, PBSFRONTLINE.ORG, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/teenbrain/
work/how.html (last visited Nov. 6, 2011) (indicating that “[m]ost of the recent advances in
brain science have involved knowledge of the biology of single neurons and synapses, not
knowledge of patterns of connections and other aspects of the brain as a system”).
193. See generally Alan C. Evans, The NIH MRI Study of Normal Brain Development,
NEUROIMAGE 30, 184–98 (Jan. 11, 2006) (providing support for the notion that MRIs are
safe to use on young children).
194. See, e.g., Jay N. Geidd, The Teen Brain: Insights from Neuroimaging, 42 J. ADO-
LESCENT HEALTH 335, 340 (2008) [hereinafter The Teen Brain] (recognizing that brain
development continues even through adolescence); Brain Development, supra note 173, at
861–63 (finding that “maximum size [of temporal-lobe gray matter] was not reached until
16.5 years for males and 16.7 years for females”); Sowell et al., supra note 173, at 8826
(identifying that myelination and pruning occur simultaneously during adolescence); Eliza-
beth R. Sowell et al., In Vivo Evidence for Post-adolescent Brain Maturation in Frontal and
Striatal Regions, NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 860 (1999) [hereinafter In Vivo Evidence] (re-
porting a “reduction in gray matter between adolescence and adulthood, probably reflect-
ing increased myelination . . . that may improve cognitive processing adulthood”).
195. See DALE PURVES, BRAINS: HOW THEY SEEM TO WORK 91 (2010) (noting that
the cerebral cortex is a sheet of neural tissue that is outermost layer of the human brain,
which is composed of gray matter); Paus et al., supra note 173, at 258 (illustrating the
amount of white matter in the brain at different stages of life).
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crease after adolescence.196  In the frontal lobes, which are involved with
response inhibition, emotional regulation, planning and organization,
there is a reduction in gray matter between adolescence and adulthood
that is due to intensive pruning of neural connections.197  The prefrontal
cortex, which is thought to be involved in goal directed behaviors, such as
rule learning, and emotional processing also experiences considerable re-
modeling of nerve connections during this same time period.198
Concurrently, the adolescent brain undergoes significant myelination,
wherein connections between nerve cells (axons) are insulated by a sub-
stance called myelin, which is also known as “white matter.”199  This
streamlines the connections inside the brain by increasing the speed at
which impulses can travel along the nerve cell.200  As part of the myelina-
tion process, neural connections between the frontal regions of the brain
and the amygdala (a part of the limbic system that is responsible for im-
pulse reactions including emotional processing of fear) become denser as
emotional and cognitive processes are integrated.201  Thus, while grey
matter decreases during adolescence, white matter increases.202  Dr. Jay
Giedd, a lead researcher in longitudinal neuroimaging studies of the ado-
lescent brain, refers to this as the “use it or lose it principle” because the
brain is pruning back unused nerve connections and strengthening used
connections to make them more effective.203  Thus, the rapid growth,
pruning, and myelination that occurs inside the adolescent brain, referred
to as neuromaturation, affects the way adolescents process information
196. Sowell et al., supra note 173.
197. See Brain Development, supra note 173, at 861 (noting that changes in cortical
gray matter in the frontal lobe peaks around age twelve); In Vivo Evidence, supra note 194
(identifying studies that suggest the frontal lobe of the brain develops later in life).
198. Linda Patia Spear, Neurobehavioral Changes in Adolescence, 9 CURRENT DIREC-
TIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 111, 112–13 (2000).
199. Paus et al., supra note 173, at 261.
200. CYNTHIA LIGHTFOOT ET AL., THE DEVELOPMENT OF CHILDREN 393 (6th ed.,
2009); Interview by PBS Frontline with Paul Thompson, Assistant Professor of Neurology,
UCLA’s Lab of Neuro-Imaging & Brain Mapping Division, Inside the Teenage Brain: How
Much Do We Know About the Brain, PBSFRONTLINE.ORG, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/
pages/frontline/shows/teenbrain/work/how.html (last visited Nov. 6, 2011).
201. See Sara B. Johnson et al., Adolescent Maturity and the Brain: The Promise and
Pitfalls of Neuroscience Research in Adolescent Health Policy, 45 J. OF ADOLESCENT
HEALTH 216, 216–21 (2009) (noting that connections between the amygdala and frontal
lobe cortices integrate cognitive and emotional process, which results in emotional matur-
ity or “the ability to regulate and to interpret emotions”); Adolescent Brain Development:
Understanding the Parts of the Brain, JUVENILE DEFENSE NETWORK 1 (Youth Advocacy
Project, Roxbury, Mass.) (N.D.) (developing adolescents tend to use their amygdala when
responding to other people’s emotions, yielding more reactionary, less reasoned percep-
tions of situations than adults).
202. Paus et al., supra note 173, at 258.
203. Spinks, supra note 26.
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by allowing the brain to “transfer information between different regions
efficiently.”204
Because “[b]ehavior depends on the formation of appropriate inter-
connections among neurons in the brain,”205 these findings suggest that
the developmental functions associated with these parts of the brain are
permanently affected during adolescence.  Environmental factors also
have a direct influence on brain development, affecting which neuronal
pathways in the brain will be retained and which will be lost as a result of
pruning.206  Essentially, the brain is being hardwired during adolescence.
“If a teen is doing music or sports or academics, those are the cells and
connections that will be hardwired.  If they’re lying on the couch or play-
ing video games or [watching] MTV, those are the cells and connections
that are going to survive.”207  Likewise, if a teenager is routinely exposed
to invasive search and seizure policies or they are forced into a defensive
posture toward authority due to adversarial relationships with teachers,
school officials, or SROs, which connections are strengthened and which
wither away?
iii. The Future
Of course, the applicability of this research to search and seizure has
certain limitations.  There are no studies that specifically link invasive
search and seizure policies to particular behavior patterns or develop-
mental outcomes.208  Scholars have confronted this issue in the context of
juvenile justice reform, warning against overstating conclusions or relying
too much on the current research in formulating policy.209  Certainly,
204. Johnson et al., supra note 201, at 217.
205. PRINCIPLES OF NEURAL SCIENCE 742–44 (Eric R. Kandel et al., eds., Elsevier
Science & Tech. 2d ed. 1985) (1981).
206. Saunders, supra note 189 (describing research by Peter R. Huttenlocher that sup-
ported the theory that one’s environment influences one’s brain formation).  “[Professor
Huttenlocher] also suggested synapse loss is determined by use or nonuse.  Unused or
nonfunctioning synapses degenerate, a theory that allows for an environmental impact, as
interactions with surroundings either fire or fail to fire particular synapses.” Id.
207. Inside the Teenage Brain, PBSFRONTLINE.ORG, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/
frontline/shows/teenbrain/interviews/giedd.html (last visited Nov. 6, 2011).
208. E-mail from Richard Lerner, Dir., Institute for Applied Research in Youth De-
velopment, Tufts University, to Sarah Jane Foreman (July 29, 2010) (on file with the
author).
209. See Jay D. Aronson, Neuroscience and Juvenile Justice, 42 AKRON L. REV. 917,
929 (2009) (“[W]e must not submit to a new kind of biological determinism which posits
that behavior is merely the ‘calculable [consequence] of an immense assembly of neurons
firing.’”) (quoting Dean Mobbs et al., Law, Responsibility and the Brain, 5 PLOS BIOLOGY
693, 693 (2007)); Emily Buss, Rethinking the Connection Between Developmental Science
and Juvenile Justice, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 493, 515 (2009) (stating that even a “sophisticated
understanding of child development does not, in itself, answer any legal questions”); Ma-
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more research needs to be done before anyone can state conclusively that
a low standard of suspicion and increased police presence during school
searches leads to negative developmental outcomes.  However, this does
not negate the existing studies’ relevance and usefulness as a framework
within which school search and seizure can be analyzed.
For example, as discussed above, the research shows that adolescents
are extremely susceptible to outside influences.  Further, this susceptibil-
ity has rather straightforward implications in the context of search and
seizure.  Part of adolescent susceptibility is a tendency to overestimate
adult authority.210  This tendency renders them vulnerable to government
overreaching in the context of school searches, particularly when the gov-
ernment actors are not “bounded in any meaningful way by recognizable
principles of the Fourth Amendment which were developed to apply to
adults.”211
Therefore, additional research should be conducted in the hope that,
over time, a better understanding can be gained of the specific ways in
which the pedagogy of punishment, including aggressive search and
seizure policies, affects adolescent development.  In the meantime, it is
fair to say that while there is much we do not know, there is much that we
do know.  The brain development studies discussed above are rich with
information that can be used in the context of school searches.  Moreo-
ver, research on bullying, harassment, and child maltreatment, demon-
strates positive links between the treatment of adolescents and
developmental outcomes.  This research is instructive because some par-
allels can be drawn between the non-accidental physical and emotional
harm characteristic of bullying, harassment, and maltreatment and the
routine subjugation of young people to arbitrary searches that can, and
often do, lead to harsh disciplinary consequences.  In addition, bullying,
harassment, and maltreatment all involve an imbalance of power between
the perpetrator and the victim, just as search and seizure involves an im-
balance of power between the actor and the subject.
roney, supra note 168, at 170 (“[A]dolescent brain science never should be the primary
argument for juvenile justice reform.”).
210. Donna M. Bishop & Hillary B. Farber, Joining the Legal Significance of Adoles-
cent Brain Development Capacities with the Legal Rights Provided by In Re Gault, 60
RUTGERS L. REV. 125, 157, 164–65 (2007) (describing the tendency of adolescents to think
their legal rights can be granted and taken away at the arbitrary discretion of adults).
“Children are dependent on adults and look to them for assistance and approval.  Yet, they
overestimate adults’ power, and therefore may be especially deferential and compliant
with requests, commands, and suggestions from teachers, clergy, police, judges, and other
authority figures.” Id. at 157.
211. John C. Coleman, Friendship and the Peer Group in Adolescence, in HANDBOOK
OF ADOLESCENT PSYCHOLOGY 408, 425–28 (Joseph Adelson ed., 1980); Guggenheim,
supra note 171, at 49.
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While a thorough review of the bullying, harassment, and maltreatment
literature is beyond the scope of this Article, some of the findings are
particularly revealing and provide a potential roadmap for future re-
search involving school search and seizure.  Bullying and harassment are
closely related and are often used interchangeably in the literature be-
cause both involve forms of peer aggression that result in victimization.
Bullying has been defined as both repeated exposure “to negative actions
on the part of one or more other students” and “a systematic abuse of
power.”212  There is a great deal of research on bullying and peer victimi-
zation.213  Most of the studies are in agreement that victimization is a
cause of psychosocial distress.214  Studies have shown that adolescents
that were bullied had lower self-esteem, lower grades, greater dislike of
school, and increased rates of absenteeism and violent behavior com-
pared to those who were not bullied.215
Similarly, in the area of child maltreatment, which is usually defined as
abuse or neglect by family, or caretakers, studies suggest that “exper-
iences of abuse, neglect, and other types of trauma may affect the devel-
opment of brain systems that regulate responsiveness to stress in ways
that may be maladaptive in terms of mental health.”216  This is because
the brain changes in response to environmental stimuli such as trauma
and stress.217  For example, “[h]igh levels of stress hormones can interfere
with the [process of] myelination,” which as discussed earlier, plays a crit-
ical role in the brain’s ability to efficiently “conduct[ ] nerve impulses be-
212. Kathleen Stassen Berger, Update on Bullying at School: Science Forgotten, 27
DEVELOPMENTAL REVIEW 90, 94 (2007).
213. See e.g., Jen Jen Chang et al., The Role of Repeat Victimization in Adolescent
Delinquent Behaviors and Recidivism, 32 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH 272 (2003) (studying the
effects on offending behaviors of youth after repeat victimization); David Perry et al., Vic-
tims of Peer Aggression, 24 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY 807 (1988) (studying the de-
gree to which certain children are victimized by peers).
214. David Hawker & Michael Boulton, Twenty Years’ Research on Peer Victimiza-
tion and Psychosocial Maladjustment: A Meta-analytic Review of Cross-sectional Studies, 41
J. CHILD PSYCHOLOGY AND PSYCHIATRY 441, 451 (2000).  “This paper presented the first
meta-analysis of the victimization-adjustment literature.  The pattern of results across
cross-sectional studies strongly suggested that victims of peer aggression experience more
negative affect, and negative thoughts about themselves, than other children.” Id.
215. See Tonja R. Nansel et al., Relationships Between Bullying and Violence Among
U.S. Youth, 157 ARCHIVES OF PEDIATRICS & ADOLESCENT MEDICINE 348, 348, 353 (2003)
(highlighting the correlation between bullying and weapon carrying and violent behavior).
216. Sandra Twardoze & John Lutzker, Child Maltreatment and the Developing Brain:
A Review of Neuroscience Perspectives, 15 AGGRESSION AND VIOLENT BEHAVIOR 59, 62
(2010).
217. Id. (citing Bruce D. Perry et al., The Neurobiology of Adaptation, and “Use-De-
pendent” Development of the Brain: How “States” Become “Traits,” 16 INFANT MENTAL
HEALTH J. 271 (1995)).
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tween the two hemispheres of the brain.”218  In particular, adolescent
maltreatment has been found to have a “pervasive influence” affecting
later negative outcomes, which include: substance abuse, suicidal
thoughts, anti-social behavior, criminal behavior, and health-risking sex-
ual behaviors.219
The findings of these studies suggest several areas for future research,
including further exploration of the causal relationship between invasive
search and seizure practices and negative developmental outcomes.  De-
pending on the age, family situation, and previous socialization of the
student, current search and seizure practices could be stressful or trau-
matic experiences which, like bullying, harassment, and maltreatment,
could affect brain development and lead to psychosocial distress.
However, even in the absence of further studies, the prevailing re-
search has the potential to inform school search policy.  The Supreme,
Court’s use of brain development science in the context of juveniles’
Eighth Amendment rights has implications for juveniles’ Fourth Amend-
ment rights as well.  By understanding how the Court used the science in
Roper v. Simmons and Graham v. Florida, we can begin to conceptualize
how a new, developmentally appropriate Fourth Amendment framework
can emerge to protect students’ rights.  For example, although Justice
Sotomayor found “citation to social science and cognitive science authori-
ties . . . unnecessary to establish [the] commonsense propositions” set
forth in J.D.B., she still recognized that “the literature confirms what ex-
perience bears out” and cites to a section of Graham that discusses ado-
lescent brain development.220
B. The Cases
i. Simmons
When Roper v. Simmons was decided by the Court in 2005, many of
the longitudinal studies utilizing functional magnetic resonance imaging
(fMRI scans) to study adolescent brain development were relatively new,
although there was a growing body of scholarly literature that centered
around the implications of this research for juvenile law and the death
penalty in particular.221  The research supported what juvenile advocates
218. Id. at 64–65.
219. Carolyn A. Smith et al., Adolescent Maltreatment and its Impact on Young Adult
Antisocial Behavior, 29 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 1099, 1100 (2005); Terence P.
Thornberry et al, The Causal Impact of Childhood-Limited Maltreatment and Adolescent
Maltreatment on Early Adult Adjustment, 46 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH 359, 364 (2010).
220. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2403–04 n.5 (2011).
221. Elizabeth Cauffman & Laurence Steinberg, (Im)maturity and Judgment in Ado-
lescence: Why Adolescents May Be Less Culpable Than Adults, 18 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 741,
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had argued for years: adolescents “are more vulnerable, more impulsive,
and less self-disciplined than adults.”222  The Simmons Court found that
juveniles lacked maturity and “are more vulnerable or susceptible to neg-
ative influences and outside pressures, including peer pressure.”223
Juveniles also embody characteristics that are “more transitory” and “less
fixed” than adults.224  The Court drew on its previous decision in Atkins
v. Virginia,225 which held that the execution of the mentally retarded vio-
lated the Eight Amendment.  In Atkins the Court reasoned that deficien-
cies in reasoning and judgment among the mentally retarded “undermine
the strength of the procedural protections that our capital jurisprudence
steadfastly guards.”226  In likening juveniles to the mentally retarded, the
Court acknowledged that the profound differences in the adolescent
brain establish the diminished capacity of juveniles thus excluding them
from the category of worst offenders for which the death penalty is re-
served.227  In Simmons, age is the defining factor that renders the practice
of juvenile executions constitutionally unsound.228
Citing to multiple amicus briefs that use neuroscience and developmen-
tal psychology to explain why adolescents are uniquely situated, the
Court uses science to explain why age is important to their analysis.229
The Simmons amici specifically reference the brain development studies
discussed above.  The American Medical Association joined by six other
organizations as amici explain that “[c]utting-edge brain imaging technol-
ogy reveals that regions of the adolescent brain do not reach a fully ma-
ture state until after the age of [eighteen].”230  The American
Psychological Association’s brief specifies: “Recent research suggests a
biological dimension to adolescent behavioral immaturity: the human
brain does not settle into its mature, adult form until after the adolescent
741–42 (2000); Scott & Steinberg, supra note 75, at 830; Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth S.
Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence: Developmental Immaturity, Diminished Re-
sponsibility, and the Juvenile Death Penalty, 58 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1009, 1016 (2003).
222. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115 n.11 (1982).
223. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005).
224. Id. at 569–70.
225. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
226. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 317 (2002).
227. Simmons, 543 U.S. at 570–71.
228. Id.
229. Brief of the Am. Medical Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent,
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (No. 03-633), 2004 WL 1633549.  Sixteen amicus briefs were filed
with the Court in support of the respondent Christopher Simmons.  Eight of those briefs
reference adolescent brain development.
230. Id. at 2.
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years have passed and a person has entered young adulthood.”231  Like-
wise, in their brief the Coalition for Juvenile Justice states that “recent
neurological studies show that during adolescence, the brain undergoes a
period of massive reorganization . . . [t]he most critical part of the brain
develops [ninty-five] percent of its capacity.”232  The ABA reiterates:
“[R]ecent scientific research supports the conclusion that the brains of
juveniles are less developed than those of non-mentally retarded
adults.”233  Similarly, the amicus briefs of the National Legal Aid and
Defender Association, the Conference of Catholic Bishop and Other Re-
ligious Organizations, Missouri Ban on Youth Executions, and the Juve-
nile Law Center (in conjunction with fifty-one other organizations) all
reference brain development as a serious issue for the Court to
consider.234
Of all the amici, the American Medical Association and the American
Psychological Association briefs (the science briefs) provide the most
thorough review of adolescent brain development research.  The Ameri-
can Psychological Association began their argument by alluding to “be-
havioral studies and recent neurological research.”235  The American
Medical Association simply refers to “science.”236  The briefs then go on
231. Brief for the Am. Psychological Ass’n & the Mo. Psychological Ass’n as Amici
Curiae Supporting Respondent at 9, Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (No. 03-633), 2004 WL
1636447, at *9.
232. Brief of the Coal. for Juvenile Justice as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respon-
dent at 9, Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (No. 03-633), 2004 WL 1629522, at *9.
233. Brief Amicus Curiae of the Am. Bar Ass’n in Support of the Respondent at 10,
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (No. 03-633), 2004 WL 1617399, *10.
234. See Brief of the Nat’l Legal Aid and Defender Ass’n as Amicus Curiae in Sup-
port of Respondent at 2–3, Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (No. 03-633), 2004 WL 1633550, at *2–3
(asserting that children under eighteen should not be put to death because they are inher-
ently different from adults, not only scientifically, but under the rules of society as well);
Brief Amici Curiae of the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops and Other Relig-
ious Organizations in Support of Respondent at 1–2, Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (No. 03-633),
2004 WL 1617400, at *2–3 (“There a majority of this Court made clear that the views of
religious organizations are ‘[a]dditional evidence’ of a broad social and professional con-
sensus against the imposition of the death penalty for a particular class of persons”); Brief
of the Coal. For Juvenile Justice as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent, supra note
232, at 8–11 (arguing that youth and adults have different physical and mental capacities).
235. See Brief of the Am. Med. Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respon-
dent, supra note 229, at 5–9 (stressing that a number of regions of an adolescents brain do
not finish fully developing until around age eighteen, particularly the regions dealing with
behaviors that are commonly associated with criminal behaviors, such as impulse control);
Brief for the Am. Psychological Ass’n & the Mo. Psychological Ass’n as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondent, supra note 231, at 3 (stressing that it is common for an adolescent
to make errors in judgment “in earlier stages of the criminal process”).
236. Brief of the Am. Med. Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent,
supra note 229, at 1.
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to explain the research and the link between brain immaturity and ado-
lescent behavior: “[P]sychological immaturity may affect a young per-
son’s decisions, attitudes, and behavior in the role of defendant in ways
that may be quite important to how they make choices, interact with po-
lice, relate to their attorneys, and respond to the trial context.”237  One
section of the brief was entitled: “Brain studies establish an anatomical
basis for adolescent behavior.”238
During oral argument, a majority of the questions posed to Simmons’
attorney related to the scientific evidence documented in those briefs.239
Justice Kennedy, the author of the majority opinion, specifically asked for
comments on the scientific evidence presented in the science briefs.240  It
is not surprising then that “[t]he science brief figured prominently in the
panoply of arguments available to Justice Kennedy when writing the
Court’s opinion.”241  The opinion heavily quotes the evidence presented
in the science briefs, which states: “[T]he scientific and sociological stud-
ies respondent and his amici cite tend to confirm, ‘[a] lack of maturity and
an underdeveloped sense of responsibility are found in youth . . . .’”242
The Simmons Court was able to utilize the science because, according to
the majority, the Eighth Amendment embodies “evolving standards” of
decency that can accommodate new understandings of adolescent devel-
opment provided by the scientific research.243  While Simmons was a
turning point for juvenile rights, the relevance of the Court’s endorse-
ment of adolescent brain development research to other aspects of juve-
237. Brief for the Am. Psychological Ass’n & the Mo. Psychological Ass’n as Amici
Curiae Supporting Respondent, supra note 231, at 30.
238. Id. at 9.
239. Transcript of Oral Argument at 21–38, Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (No. 03-633), 2004
U.S. Trans. LEXIS 55 (questioning whether the data indicates that adolescents are still
mentally developing or whether it simply indicates that their personalities will change
while serving long sentences, a fact common to adult prisoners as well).  A number of
justices also suggested that the scientific data presented in the briefs ought to have been
introduced in some way at trial in order to give the jury an opportunity to consider the
scientific facts alleged by the briefs. Id. at 31–34.
240. Id. (asking for the attorney’s comment on why the American Psychological Asso-
ciation would say that adolescents were capable of making a rational decision regarding
abortions, but suggest in this case that juveniles should not be considered mentally mature
enough to face the death penalty).  Simmons’ attorney argued the APA had not submitted
inconsistent viewpoints; rather, in the matter of abortions, the issue was competency to
make certain decisions, whereas here the issue is a lack of extreme moral culpability neces-
sary to sentence someone to death. Id. at 27–28.  The mentally retarded are permitted to
determine whether or not to have an abortion, but the Court has held that they cannot be
put to death. Id. at 27.
241. Aliya Haider, Roper v. Simmons: The Role of the Science Brief, 3 OHIO ST. J.
CRIM. L. 369, 376 (2006).
242. Maroney, supra note 168, at 92–93.
243. Simmons, 543 U.S. at 560–61.
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nile law, including other Eighth Amendment considerations, was unclear.
Although scholarship abounded, many were skeptical of the decision’s
reach.244
ii. Graham
In 2009 the Court revisited the issue central to Simmons.  In Graham v.
Florida, the Court analyzed an Eighth Amendment issue involving the
application of life without parole sentences to juvenile offenders; as in the
Simmons case, Graham generated several amici briefs that discussed ado-
lescent brain development.245  The American Medical Association and
the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry filed a sci-
ence brief in support of neither party that was nearly identical in sub-
stance to the American Medical Association brief filed in Simmons;
likewise, the American Psychological Association, the American Psychi-
atric Association, the National Association of Social Workers, and
Mental Health America filed a brief in support of the juvenile petitioner
that used the same brain development arguments that were successful in
Simmons.246  “Research in developmental psychology and neuros-
cience—including the research presented to the Court in Simmons and
additional research conducted since Simmons was decided—confirms and
strengthens the conclusion that juveniles, as a group, differ from adults in
the salient ways the Court identified.”247  During the oral argument, Gra-
ham’s attorney cited “science” as the reason “to draw the line at [eigh-
teen]” with regard to life without parole sentences.248  Again, the
244. Maroney, supra note 168, at 92–93.
245. See, e.g., Brief for NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc. et al. as Amici Curiae
in Support of Petitioners at 3–6, Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. __, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010)
(No. 08-7412), 2009 WL 2197340, at *3–6 (arguing that scientific evidence, prior rulings,
and common experience all indicate that children are not as mentally developed as adults,
and therefore should not be subject to harsh sentences such as life without parole).
246. See generally Brief for the Am. Psychological Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae Sup-
porting Petitioners, Graham, 560 U.S. __, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (No. 08-7412), 2009 WL 2236778
(arguing that juveniles are far more susceptible to immature and irresponsible behavior
then their adult counterparts, and although their crimes should not be excused, courts
should not impose sentences that permanently end their free lives).
247. Id. at 3.
248. Transcript of Oral Argument at 11–12, Graham, 560 U.S. __, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (No.
08-7412), 2009 WL 3731318, at *11–12.  In answering questions from Chief Justice Roberts,
Mr. Gowdy stated the following:
Roper [v. Simmons] states, and the science — States that base it on the science, that at
that age we cannot make a determination about whether or not the adolescent will or
will not reform. . . .  [T]he Court in Roper [v. Simmons] struggled with where to draw
the line between maturity and immaturity and it concluded, rightly so, to draw the line
at 18 based on both the science and the legislative determinations.
Id. at 11.
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scientific arguments that had provided a basis for Simmons persuaded the
Court that the particular vulnerabilities of adolescence warranted greater
protection under the Eighth Amendment.  “No recent data provide[s]
reason to reconsider the Court’s observations in Roper [v. Simmons]
about the nature of juveniles.  As petitioner’s amici point out, develop-
ments in psychology and brain science continue to show fundamental dif-
ferences between juvenile and adult minds.”249  The Court cites Simmons
heavily and makes similar arguments about the mutable character of
juveniles.250  “[J]uveniles . . . ‘are more vulnerable or susceptible to nega-
tive influences and outside pressures, including peer pressure’; and their
characters are ‘not as well formed.’”251  The Court held that sentencing a
juvenile to life without the possibility of parole for a non-homicidal of-
fense is a violation of the Eighth Amendment.252  Again, the Court recog-
nizes that “‘evolving standards of decency’” guide the decision.253
Graham strengthens Simmons and advances the rights of adolescents
by emphasizing that, based on brain developments, it is difficult to deter-
mine whether an adolescent is a threat to society or simply irresponsi-
ble.254  Some of the concerns with Simmons were that it had limited
applicability to other areas of law because “[d]eath is different.”255  If
there is uncertainty about the developmental status of adolescents, it
seems reasonable to shield them from one of the most extreme and final
punishments our judicial system can impose. Graham moves the discus-
sion of adolescent development beyond the death penalty.256  The impor-
tation of Simmons discussion on adolescent brain development into
Graham’s holding may also signify the Court’s willingness to consider the
applicability of this research to other doctrines.  As Justice Roberts as-
serts in his concurrence, “Roper [v. Simmons’] conclusion that juveniles
are typically less culpable than adults has pertinence beyond capital
249. Graham, 560 U.S. at __, 130 S. Ct. at 2026.
250. Id. (indicating that juveniles are more capable of change than adults).
251. Id. at 2026 (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005)).
252. Id. at 2030.
253. Id. at 2021 (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976)).
254. See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. __, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2026 (2010) (stressing that
there is no recent data that would make the Court reconsider their analysis on brain devel-
opment since Simmons).
255. Id. at 2046.  “[T]he death penalty is different from other punishments in kind
rather than degree.”  Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 294 (1983).  Prior to the Graham deci-
sion, some commentators did not believe the Court would find the scientific evidence per-
suasive in a case of life without parole. See, e.g., Maroney, supra note 168, at 120–22
(commenting that the framework of brain science applied in Simmons would not be suc-
cessful in other non-homicidal cases).
256. Graham, 560 U.S. at __, 130 S. Ct. at 2034 (holding that the Constitution prohib-
its the “imposition of a life without parole” for a non-homicidal offense in a juvenile case).
354 THE SCHOLAR [Vol. 14:301
cases.”257  The pertinence of the Fourth Amendment in Graham is not
necessarily in the holding itself, but it is inferred from the Court’s analy-
sis.  The science not only suggests that adolescents are less culpable than
adults, but that they have “a heightened susceptibility to negative influ-
ences and outside pressures” and their character is “‘more transitory’ and
‘less fixed’ than that of an adult.”258  Negative environmental pressures
may create patterns of behavior that under the “use it or lose it” principle
described by Dr. Giedd, become fixed over time as the adolescent ma-
tures into adulthood.259
The Supreme Court’s recognition and use of adolescent brain develop-
ment studies in Simmons and Graham is encouraging, particularly be-
cause the application of brain development has been controversial when
resolving constitutional questions.  The Court faced sharp criticism when
it cited to social science research in footnote eleven of Brown v. Board of
Education.260  Scholars and Justices continue to debate the proper place
of science in constitutional interpretation.261  For many critics “the prob-
lem is not that the social sciences are insufficiently scientific.  The prob-
257. Id. at 2039 (Roberts, J., concurring).
258. Id. at 2038.
259. Inside the Teenage Brain, supra note 207.
260. 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954).  In Brown, footnote eleven is written as follows:
K. B. Clark, Effect of Prejudice and Discrimination on Personality Development
(Midcentury White House Conference on Children and Youth, 1950); Witmer and Ko-
tinsky, Personality in the Making (1952), c. VI; Deutscher and Chein, The Psychologi-
cal Effects of Enforced Segregation: A Survey of Social Science Opinion, 26 J.Psychol.
259 (1948); Chein, What are the Psychological Effects of Segregation Under Condi-
tions of Equal Facilities?, 3 Int. J. Opinion and Attitude Res. 229 (1949); Brameld,
Educational Costs, in Discrimination and National Welfare (MacIver, ed., 1949),
44–48; Frazier, The Negro in the United States (1949), 674-681.  And see generally
Myrdal, An American Dilemma (1944).
Id. at 494 n.11.  For a critique of Brown’s reliance of social science, see Charles L. Black Jr.,
The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421, 428 (1960); Edmond Cahn,
Jurisprudence, 30 N.Y.U. L. REV. 150, 157–58 (1955) (commenting that there is a “danger”
in following the Court’s adherence to social science in Brown and Bolling); Ronald Dwor-
kin, Social Sciences and Constitutional Rights – the Consequences of Uncertainty, 6 J.L. &
EDUC. 3, 6 (1977) (stating that dependence on social science is not encouraged for constitu-
tional cases).
261. See David M. O’Brien, Of Judicial Myths, Motivations and Justifications: A Post-
script on Social Science and the Law, 64 JUDICATURE 285, 288–89 (1981) (discussing that it
is problematic for the Court to consider social science in analyzing a constitutional issue).
See also Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 470 (1972) (Burger, J., dissenting) (“The com-
mands of the Constitution cannot fluctuate with the shifting tides of scientific opinion.”);
William E. Doyle, Can Social Justice Data Be Used in Judicial Decisionmaking?, 6 J.L. &
EDUC. 13, 18 (1977) (stating, “courts do not take social science facts as the touchstone of
constitutional interpretation because such data is [objective] rather than substantive in
nature”).
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lem is that they are too scientific for the normative task at hand.”262  As a
result of the social science debate, courts tend to ignore psychology and
other social sciences in favor of a common sense approach.263  However,
common sense alone offers only limited insight into psychological, emo-
tional, or social development.  Moreover, as it relates to children, com-
mon sense can often become a proxy for paternalism justifying state
infringement into their fundamental rights.264 Simmons and Graham
raise the possibility that the current Supreme Court may be willing to
move away from traditional notions about the place of children in the
constitutional polity and consider developmental research when defining
the constitutional rights of adolescents.
The question then becomes, how does the science, which was so influ-
ential in Simmons and Graham, impact a constitutional inquiry into
262. Anne C. Dailey, Developing Citizens, 91 IOWA L. REV. 432, 449 (2006).
263. See Robert E. Shepherd Jr., A Developmental Perspective on the Adjudication of
Youthful Offenders: Comments on Steinberg and Cauffman’s “The Elephant in the Court-
room,” 6 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 429, 430 (1999) (suggesting that lawyers, policy makers,
and psychologists must begin to communicate in concrete terms).  He continues by discuss-
ing how:
Almost twenty years ago, Dr. Arlene Skolnick pointed out that there are[ ] three
stances taken by policymakers, lawyers, and judges toward psychology (and the other
social sciences): (1) they ignore it, by far the most common approach; (2) they rely on
it for expert advice, assuming that research findings contain clear policy mandates
waiting to be put into effect; or (3) they tend to be manipulative in using it—the
expert is called in to put the stamp of science on what is basically a value judgment.
Id.  Dr. Skolnick also “proposed ‘a fourth alternative, namely, that legal and policy deci-
sions concerning children should be informed by developmental research, even though
such decisions cannot be determined by psychological considerations alone.’” Id. at 431.
264. See Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 214 (1975) (holding that the
city’s ordinance was unconstitutional even though one of its purposes was to protect chil-
dren from viewing sexually explicit movies).  “It is well settled that a State or municipality
can adopt more stringent controls on communicative materials available to youths than on
those available to adults.” Id. at 212. See also Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 649
(1968) (Stewart, J., concurring in the result) (arguing that a minor may, “in some precisely
delineated areas,” lack capacity to exercise rights).  Some scholars argue that the rights of
youth are restricted simply because they are young.  See Leon Letwin, Perspectives on the
Post-Civil War Amendments, After Goss v. Lopez: Student Status as Suspect Classification?,
29 STAN. L. REV. 627, 627 (1977) (stressing that past Court decisions have regarded young
people as “unentitled to independent rights”). See also Laurence H. Tribe, Childhood,
Suspect Classifications, and Conclusive Presumptions: Three Linked Riddles, 39 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 8, 11 (1975) (noting that age alone should not suffice to take a funda-
mental right away from a young person); Michael S. Wald, Children’s Rights: A Framework
for Analysis, 12 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 255, 266 (1979) (explaining that there is not an expla-
nation by courts or by legislatures as to why only some rights, and not all rights, are
granted to children).  For a review of the paternalistic views of Hobbes, Locke, and Mill,
see Victor L. Worsfold, A Philosophical Justification for Children’s Rights, 44 HARV.
EDUC. REV. 29, 29 (1974).
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Fourth Amendment reasonableness?  If the recent J.D.B. case is to serve
as a model, perhaps the Court will utilize the science only tangentially, as
underlying support for a common-sense approach to the normative in-
quiry.265 J.D.B. is significant because it specifically makes the age of the
suspect a critical part of the constitutional inquiry,266 which is what I pro-
pose in the Fourth Amendment context.  J.D.B.’s common sense ap-
proach focuses on expanding, rather than contracting, the rights of
adolescents.267  This is not the paternal common sense of the past, but a
common sense supported by multidisciplinary research.  Perhaps this is
part of the legacy of Simmons and Graham that is most accessible to
other areas of the law—reclaiming common sense from the realm of un-
verified folk tales and bringing it into the twenty-first century.
The Court’s acknowledgement in Simmons, Graham, and J.D.B. that
adolescents “are more vulnerable or susceptible to . . . outside pres-
sures”268 has relevance to the Fourth Amendment analysis of school
searches.  “[A]lthough the necessities for a public school search may be
greater than for one outside the school, the psychological damage that
would be risked on sensitive children by random search[es] insufficiently
justified by the necessities is not tolerable.”269  Moreover, the public
school setting is an important forum for the democratic socialization of
young people.270  Thus, in light of adolescents’ unformed characters,
265. See J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2403 (2011) (highlight-
ing that, unlike adults, children will react differently to a police interrogation).  As men-
tioned earlier, the Court does cite to Graham’s recognition and endorsement of
developments in psychology and brain science since Simmons. Id.  In addition, the Peti-
tioner and all of the amici filing briefs in support of the Petitioner cite to the developmen-
tal science.  Reply Brief for Petitioner at 5, J.D.B., 654 U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 2394 (No. 09-
11121), 2011 WL 882588, at *5; Brief of Center on Wrongful Convictions of Youth, et al., as
Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 21–22, J.D.B., 654 U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 2394 (No.
09-11121), 2010 WL 5385329, at *21–22; Brief of the Am. Bar Ass’n as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Petitioner at 10–12, J.D.B., 654 U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 2394 (No. 09-11121), 2010
WL 5385326, at *10–12; Brief of Juvenile Law Ctr. et al., as Amici Curiae in Support of
Petitioner at 11–14, J.D.B., 654 U.S. __,131 S. Ct. 2394 (No. 09-11121), 2010 WL 5535752,
at *11–14; see also Brief of the Nat’l Ass’n of Criminal Def. Lawyers as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Petitioner at 15, J.D.B., 654 U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 2394 (No. 09-11121), 2010 WL
5385327, at *15 (mentioning that young children react different to police interrogations
than adults).
266. J.D.B., 564 U.S. at __, 131 S. Ct. at 2398–99.
267. See id. at 2403 (holding that a reasonable child will feel pressured to police
interrogation).
268. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. __, 30 S. Ct. 2011, 2026 (2010) (citing Roper v.
Simons, 543 U.S. 551, 569–70 (2005)); J.D.B., 560 U.S. at __, 131 S. Ct. at  2397 (citing
Roper v. Simons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005)).
269. People v. Scott D., 315 N.E.2d 466, 471 (N.Y. 1974).
270. See KENNETH DAUTRICH ET AL., THE FUTURE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT: THE
DIGITAL MEDIA, CIVIC EDUCATION, AND FREE EXPRESSION RIGHTS IN AMERICA’S HIGH
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“compelling authorities to justify their use of power in terms of applicable
legal standards may not be so bad after all” because it will instill a sense
of personhood in the constitutional sense, which is a key component of
democratic citizenship.271
IV. FROM SCIENCE TO SUBSTANCE
“Children should be educated and instructed in the
principles of freedom.”
John Adams, Defense of the Constitutions, 1787
The reasonable suspicion standard for school searches is amorphous
and flexible; therefore, it places very little limitation on government ac-
tion.  As we have seen, only when a student is subjected to complete hu-
miliation is the searching school official’s authority called into
question.272  Many legal scholars agree that the standard of reasonable
suspicion in school searches needs to be reconsidered.273  Some argue
that reasonable suspicion is constitutionally problematic because the lack
of a clear individualized suspicion requirement further eviscerates the al-
ready low threshold of “reasonableness”.274  Furthermore, as Michael
Pinard points out, the “increased interdependency between law enforce-
ment authorities and public school officials . . . create a disconnection
between rights and ramifications” when the standard for school searches
is reasonable suspicion.275  As discussed in Part II of this Article, the in-
flux of police into public school in conjunction with the reasonable suspi-
cion standard creates opportunities and incentives for abuse because it
SCHOOLS 27 (2008) (recognizing that “schools can directly influence students’ minds and
outlooks and thus infuse values directly into their views on society, government and
laws.”).
271. Letwin, supra note 264, at 652.
272. See Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2641 (2009)
(finding that a school official’s strip search of a student “down to her underwear” consti-
tuted an unreasonable search given the circumstances).
273. See Gardner, supra note 73, at 897–98 (“urg[ing] the judiciary to require a finding
of individualized suspicion as a prerequisite to valid searches and seizures”); Josh Kagan,
Reappraising T.L.O.’s “Special Needs” Doctrine in an Era of School-Law Enforcement
Entanglement, 33 J.L. & EDUC. 291, 291 (2004) (questioning the continued applicability of
T.L.O. given that schools and law enforcement have become “increasingly entangled” in
recent years); Matthew Lynch, Mere Platitudes: The “Domino Effect” of School Search
Cases on the Fourth Amendment Rights of Every American, 91 IOWA L. REV. 781, 785
(2006) (discussing a “domino effect” of falling Fourth Amendment rights beginning with
the government’s infringement of students’ rights in schools); Pinard, supra not 127, 1070
(recommending that a more protective probable cause standard govern student searches
when law enforcement has a presence in the school).
274. Gardner, supra note 73, at 937–38.
275. Pinard, supra note 127, at 1069, 1124.
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blurs the line between school officials and law enforcement officers.276
Others have observed that it denigrates American values by creating a
slippery slope down which other cherished ideals are slowly sliding.277
Furthermore, reasonable suspicion is not a developmentally appropri-
ate standard.  A school environment, where youth are criminalized and
denied basic privacy rights, is detrimental to positive youth develop-
ment.278  “A system predicated on hostility to student rights runs the risk
not only of forfeiting this educational opportunity but of exacerbating the
very difficulties it is seeking to cure.”279 The malleability of the adoles-
cent brain “suggest[s] that adolescence may provide a sort of ‘second
chance’ to refine behavior control.”280  Under this view, even troubled
teenagers have the capacity to develop into productive young citizens.
Because adolescents spend a significant amount of time in school, the
school environment plays a large role in their development.281  By mak-
ing democratic socialization as part of the school environment, it can be
instrumental in providing positive influences to a student’s developmen-
tal process.  Conversely, a student’s future potential can become limited
when exposed to negative environmental influences become entrenched
as nerve connections in the brain responsible for those behaviours are
strengthened by repeated use.282
The need for safe schools and the danger posed by even a single violent
actor with a gun is great.283  Therefore, when it comes to preventing vio-
276. Id. at 1071–74.  “These different standards encourage law enforcement officers to
persuade school officials to conduct searches on their behalf when the level of suspicion
does not rise to probable cause, relying on the lower reasonableness standard as a boot-
strap.” Id. at 1092.
277. Lynch, supra note 273, 789–91.
278. Letwin, supra note 264, at 649.
279. Id.
280. Gargi Taludker, Decision-Making is Still a Work in Progress for Teenagers,
BRAIN CONNECTION (July 2000), http://brainconnection.positscience.com/topics/?main=
news-in-rev/teen-frontal.
281. See Albert D. Farrell et. al., Peer and School Problems in the Lives of Urban
Adolescents: Frequency, Difficulty and Relation to Adjustment, 44 J. SCH. PSYCHOLOGY
169, 170 (2006) (discussing the importance of the school setting as an important context for
the social development of youths).
282. Inside the Teenage Brain, supra note 207.
283. E.g., Teen Kills Himself and Another, too, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Jan. 6, 2011,
available at 2011 WLNR 299813; Lee Roop, Fatal School Shooting Tied to Fledgling Gang
Activity, HUNTSVILLE TIMES, Feb. 10, 2010, available at 2010 WL 28819896; Cara DiPas-
quale & Alberto Trevino, Student Kills 1, Injures 2 in High School Shooting, CHIC. TRIB.,
Nov. 9, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR 23494199; P.J. Huffstutter & Stephanie Simon, 10
Dead After School Shooting: Boy Kills Grandparents, then Fires on Students and Staff on a
Minnesota Indian Reservation, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2005, available at http://arti-
cles.latimes.com/2005/mar/22/nation/na-shooting22; Lianne Hart, School Shooting Kills
Teen in New Orleans; Three Other Students were Injured by Stray Bullets. Four Teenage
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lence at school, the violent actor often serves as the example upon which
policy is shaped.  The Court’s school search jurisprudence is no exception:
in the balance between safety and privacy, safety takes precedence.284
For many, the sacrifice of students’ privacy rights is worth the gain in
safety and security for all members of the school community.  For others,
the lack of privacy in school is symptomatic of a culture of disempowered
citizenship and a general lack of agency vis-a`-vis the state.285  For these
populations, the fear of school violence is valid, but so is the frustration
and contempt towards a justice system that seems built on racial
subordination.286
Therefore, in this context, in order for the balance between safety and
privacy to be weighed adequately “the degree of community resentment
aroused by particular practices” must be considered when assessing “the
quality of the intrusion upon reasonable expectations of personal security
caused by those practices.”287
A school search framework that better accounts for the developmental
needs of youth would appreciate that adolescents are future autonomous
Suspects Arrested, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Apr. 15, 2003, available at http://arti-
cles.orlandosentinel.com/2003-04-15/news/0304150343_1_new-orleans-stray-bullets-assault-
rifle; Suspect Tells Investigators He Planned to Kill Himself; California School Shooting:
Records Show He Counted Out 40 Bullets Before Class, TELEGRAPH HERALD, Mar. 14,
2001, at A2; Scott Sunde & Steve Miletich, Teen’s Rage Turns Deadly, High School Shoot-
ing Kills 1, Wounds 23, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, May 22, 1998, available at 1998
WLNR 1955115.  As compared to other violent crimes, school shootings are uncommon;
however, they never fail to shock the conscience and for this reason they grab headlines
whenever they happen.  Todd Zwillich, CDC: School Homicides Are Rare, WEBMD (Jan.
17, 2008), http://www.webmd.com/parenting/news/20080117/cdc-school-homicides-are-rare.
284. See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 661 (1995) (finding that the
high degree of government concern was met in justifying school searches in violation of an
expectation of privacy); see also New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985) (recogniz-
ing “that maintaining security and order in the schools requires a certain degree of flexibil-
ity in school disciplinary procedures”).
285. Paul J. Hirschfield & Katarzyna Celinska, Beyond Fear: Sociological Perspectives
on the Criminalization of School Discipline, 5 SOC. COMPASS 1, 7–8 (2011).
286. ANDERSON, supra note 22, at 32–34 (describing that a code of the street has de-
veloped as a set of informal rules that dictates the acceptable interpersonal public behav-
ior; this code of the street has emerged as a cultural adaptation because of the lack of trust
in the judicial system, which seems to represent the White population). See also Amruta
Ghanekar & Sara Taveras, MIMIC: Tackling the Root Causes of Juvenile Delinquency,
PHILA. SOC. INNOVATIONS  J., Feb. 2010, http://www.philasocialinnovations.org/site/index.
php?option=COm_content&view=article&id=116%3Amimic-tackling-the-root-causes-of-
juvenile-delinquency&catid=21%3Afeatured-social-innovations&Itemid=35&showall=1
(discussing a community based program organized by ex-offenders concerned with the
high number of youth entering the juvenile justice system).
287. Tracey Maclin, Race and the Fourth Amendment, 51 VAND. L. REV. 333, 365
(1998).
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citizens in the process of developing a sense of personhood.  A develop-
mentally appropriate paradigm would encourage positive youth develop-
ment and democratic socialization.  To this end, the Fourth Amendment
right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures must be viewed
as a vehicle through which adolescents’ capacity to become “mature
adults capable of democratic self-government” and self-realization—“the
process by which an individual defines himself”—can be developed.288
Such an approach would recognize that there is a coincidence of interest
shared by students, school officials, and society in developing democratic
citizens.
Below, the positive youth development and democratic socialization,
which has both political and legal dimensions is discussed.  Concepts of
privacy, autonomy, and personhood are important to political socializa-
tion whereas legal socialization relates to perceptions of the law and legal
authorities.  Also below I introduce the “positive youth development ap-
proach” to school searches that incorporates into the reasonableness bal-
ance the convergent interest in a public education system that creates
law-abiding, autonomous, right-holding citizens.
A. The Positive Youth Development Approach
Science suggests and the Court accepts the notion that negative envi-
ronmental influences impact adolescent development in negative ways.289
The logical contra positive is that positive environmental factors can en-
courage positive development in adolescents; this proposition has been
adopted by youth advocates in many different disciplines and is referred
to as “positive youth development” (PYD).290  Instead of looking at “ad-
olescent development through the lens of problems and defi-
288. John H. Garvey, Freedom and Choice in Constitutional Law, 94 HARV. L. REV.
1756, 1771–73 (1981).
289. Brief for the Am. Psychological Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petition-
ers, supra note 246, at 15.
Because of their developmental immaturity, adolescents are more susceptible than
adults to the negative influences of their environment—and, indeed, their actions are
shaped directly by family and peers in ways that adults’ are not.  “Adolescents are
dependent on living circumstances of their parents and families and hence are vulnera-
ble to the impact of conditions well beyond their control.”
Id.
290. Richard F. Catalano et al., Positive Youth Development in the United States: Re-
search Findings on Evaluations of Positive Youth Development Programs, 591 ANNALS AM.
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 98, 101–02 (2004).
Positive youth development programs are approaches that seek to achieve one or
more of the following objectives: [bonding, resilience, social competence, emotional
competence, cognitive competence, behavioral competence, moral competence, self-
determination, spirituality, self-efficacy, clear and positive identity, belief in the future,
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cits . . . positive youth development focuses on strengthening protection
in youths’ lives while simultaneously reducing risk.  The notion is to move
beyond simple risk avoidance . . . and capitalize on building resilience
through competency development.”291
This approach is utilized by entities ranging from state health depart-
ments, non-profit educational schools, and public defender offices to ju-
venile court programs.  There is an emerging body of literature regarding
the application of PYD to juvenile justice.292  The positive youth develop-
ment approach “gained significant traction beginning in the 1990s.”293
Around the same time, the research findings on adolescent brain devel-
opment were being released; the science of adolescent brain development
supports the key facets of the youth development approach “that children
are different from adults, are capable of change, and need support and
opportunities for healthy development.”294  Because of the extensive
growth and development taking place in the teenage brain, adolescence
provides an “opportunity to help youth become responsible adults” by
laying “a foundation . . . that will help them make informed decisions.”295
This is exactly what the positive youth development approach aims to
achieve.  It focuses on the inherent strengths of young people, which in-
clude the potential for structural and functional change of the adolescent
brain and the strengths that exist in their environment, often referred to
as “ecological developmental assets.”296  This focus can help youth ma-
ture into successful adults.297  As Dr. Giedd describes, the teenage brain
is “not done being built.”298  Therefore, “if the strengths of youth are
aligned across adolescence with ecological developmental assets, then
recognition for positive behavior, opportunities for prosocial involvement, prosocial
norms].
Id.
291. James M. Frabutt et al., Envisioning a Juvenile Justice System that Supports Posi-
tive Youth Development, 22 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 107, 108–09 (2008).
292. Id. at 107–08 (explaining that there are plenty of scholars, child advocates, and
practitioners who promote an integrated system that will support and aid youths in becom-
ing competent adults); JEFFREY A. BUTTS ET AL., CHAPIN HALL CTR. FOR CHILDREN AT
THE UNIV. OF CHI., ISSUE BRIEF: FOCUSING JUVENILE JUSTICE ON POSITIVE YOUTH DE-
VELOPMENT 3–4 (2005) (describing the need for effective programs to address youth delin-
quency and explaining the factors needed to accomplish such programs).
293. Frabutt et al., supra note 291, at 108.
294. NAT’L JUVENILE JUSTICE NETWORK, USING ADOLESCENT BRAIN RESEARCH TO
INFORM POLICY: A GUIDE FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE ADVOCATES (2008).
295. Id.
296. Richard M. Lerner et al., Exploring the Foundations and Functions of Adolescent
Thriving Within the 4-H Study of Positive Youth Development: A View of the Issues, 30 J.
APPLIED DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 567, 567 (2009).
297. Id.
298. Inside the Teenage Brain, supra note 207.
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every young person’s development can be improved.”299  School is an ex-
ample of one such ecological development asset.  A student’s experience
of the school environment, and the types of resources provided to the
student can cultivate adolescent change in a positive direction.
B. The Democratic Socialization Function of Public Education
The notion that public school is a primary mechanism for the social-
izing of America’s youth is not new.  Courts and scholars have long rec-
ognized the importance of public education in the formation of
democratic citizens.300  Although some scholars are critical of certain as-
pects of the socialization process, it is clear that socialization occurs in
public school through curriculum and institutional practices.301  Professor
Betsy Levin posits:
If the educational institution is wholly undemocratic, students are
likely to get mixed signals with regard to the democratic values
299. Lerner, supra note 296.
300. See e.g., Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986) (“Public
education must prepare pupils for citizenship in the Republic. . . . It must inculcate the
habits and manners of civility as values in themselves conducive to happiness and as indis-
pensable to the practice of self-government in the community and the nation” (quoting C.
BEARD & M. BEARD, NEW BASIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 228 (1968))); Bd. of
Educ., Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 864 (1982) (noting
“that public schools are vitally important ‘in the preparation of individuals for participation
as citizens,’ and as vehicles for ‘inculcating fundamental values necessary to the mainte-
nance of a democratic political system’” (quoting Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76-77
(1979)); PAULA S. FASS, OUTSIDE IN: MINORITIES AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERI-
CAN EDUCATION 27 (1989) (describing progressive educational theorist John Dewey’s no-
tion that public school should be “instrument[s] of morality and citizenship,” as well as
“democratic and participatory”); Chiang-Le Heng et al., Violence in Schools: Examining
the Differential Impact of School Climate on Student’s Coping Ability, 19 EDU. & L. J. 95,
97 (2009) (“The school setting is one of the most significant socialization contexts in our
culture and has a significant potential to affect a child’s life course.”).
301. See Kenneth L. Karst, Law, Cultural Conflict, and the Socialization of Children,
91 CALIF. L. REV. 967, 992–993 (2003) (describing how dominant groups use the socializing
power of schools to maintain dominance); Betsy Levin, Educating Youth for Citizenship:
The Conflict Between Authority and Individual Rights in the Public School, 95 YALE L.J.
1647, 1649 (1986) (“Socialization to values through a uniform educational experience nec-
essarily conflicts with freedom of choice and the diversity of a pluralistic society.”). See
generally Felice J. Levine & June Louin Tapp, The Dialectic of Legal Socialization in Com-
munity and School, in LAW JUSTICE AND THE INDIVIDUAL IN SOCIETY: PSYCHOLOGICAL
AND LEGAL ISSUES 163, 179–182 (June Louin Tapp & Felice J. Levine eds., 1977).
The school setting can have a significant impact on the legal socialization of youth.
[The] focus on stimulating ethical use of the law during childhood is based on two
assumptions—the primacy of the formative years in determining patterns of legal rea-
soning and the potency of initial socialization over resocialization.
Id. at 279.
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needed to function as citizens in our society: the way in which school
administrators operate schools may have a more powerful influence
on students than the lessons in their civics textbooks.302
As discussed in Part II above, students are learning powerful lessons
from their interactions with school officials and school police.  The harsh
disciplinary practices of what I have described as a “ghetto education”
socialize youth in ways that are antithetical to democratic citizenship.  In
order for public high schools to engage in citizen education, which neces-
sarily includes democratic socialization, student privacy rights must be
taken seriously.  The way in which students experience rights, like institu-
tional practices and textbook lessons, can contribute to democratic
socialization.303
The socializing role of student Fourth Amendment rights is particularly
important because individual privacy is a hallmark of democratic citizen-
ship.304  Privacy is also the overriding concern of the Fourth Amend-
ment’s protections against unreasonable search and seizure.305
“Constitutional protection of privacy is tied closely to the more basic
right to be afforded dignity and self-respect—in short, to be treated as a
person.”306  Individual privacy is closely connected to individual auton-
omy, another important facet of citizenship, because negative privacy
rights carve out a sphere of constitutionally protected space within which
an individual can make autonomous decisions about one’s life.  However,
because the right to engage in autonomous decision-making has tradition-
ally been predicated on the capacity for mature, rational decision-making,
children’s privacy rights have been limited.307
302. Levin, supra note 301.
303. See Anne C. Dailey, Children’s Constitutional Rights, 95 MINN. L. REV. 2099,
2125, 2143 (2011) (describing a “developmental theory of children’s constitutional rights”).
304. Stephen J. Schnably, Beyond Griswold: Foucauldian and Republican Approaches
to Privacy, 23 CONN. L. REV. 861, 871–72 (1991) (describing constitutional theories that
connect the protection of privacy with a conception of democratic citizenship).
305. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Id.
306. Gardner, supra note 73, at 905.
307. Even cases granting children privacy rights curtail those rights in significant ways.
See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979) (recognizing “three reasons justifying the
conclusion that the constitutional rights of children cannot be equated with those of adults:
the peculiar vulnerability of children; their inability to make critical decisions in an in-
formed, mature manner; and the importance of the parental role in child rearing”);
Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976) (“The Court indeed,
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Even assuming that a model of children’s privacy rights that limits such
rights due to immaturity and an undeveloped capacity for autonomous
choice is justified as applied to younger children, adolescents present a
challenge to this model because of their unique developmental situation.
Unlike younger children, adolescents are developing the social skills that
will carry them forward to successful adulthood; the requisite nerve con-
nections that create the capacity for mature, rational decision-making are
in the process of being formed.
Autonomy, privacy, sexuality, individuality, and personal achievement
are areas that adolescents explore as they mature into adulthood.308  As a
result of this “growing need for independence,” adolescents may embar-
rass easily and seek a greater sense of privacy in their personal lives.309
For students, the school environment serves as the laboratory for this de-
veloping sense of privacy.  According to Professor Gary Melton, “as chil-
dren approach adolescence, privacy becomes important as a marker of
independence and self-differentiation.  Threats to the privacy of school-
aged children may be reasonably hypothesized to be . . . threats to self-
esteem.”310  This can have an even greater impact on student’s in inner-
city schools because school may be one of the more “private” environ-
ments they experience.311  “The implication is that, as options for privacy
decrease, spaces which suburban, middle-class people may regard as pub-
lic may taken on meaning as ‘private’ places for inner-city, lower-class
however, long has recognized that the State has somewhat broader authority to regulate
the activities of children than of adults.”). See also New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341
(1985) (finding the school’s search of a student’s purse to be reasonable).
[T]he accommodation of the privacy interests of schoolchildren with the substantial
need of teachers and administrators for freedom to maintain order in the schools does
not require strict adherence to the requirement that searches be based on probable
cause to believe that the subject of the search has violated or is violating the law.
Id.
308. Jennifer Drobac, “Developing Capacity”: Adolescent “Consent” at Work, at Law
and in the Sciences of the Mind, 10 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L & POL’Y 1, 27 (2006).  The depri-
vation of autonomy is the hallmark of childhood. Id.  “In turn, dominant norms relating to
children include young, vulnerable, [W]hite, middle-class, two-parented, dependent, obedi-
ent, innocent, sexually inactive, English-speaking, unemployed, cared-for and not care-giv-
ing, irrational, unformed, and incapable of judgment . . . [t]he law promotes these norms
and frowns upon or ignores such phenomena as . . . children’s subjectivity, voice, and
agency.”  Annette Appell, Representing Children Representing What?: Critical Reflections
on Lawyering for Children, 39 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 573, 584 (2008).
309. Drobac, supra note 307 at 28 (explaining how teenagers “may not want to be
seen with their parents,” may lock their bedroom door, and may keep a journal or diary in
order to develop a sense of autonomy).
310. Gary B. Melton, Minors and Privacy: Are Legal and Psychological Concepts
Compatible?, 62 NEB. L. REV. 455, 488 (1983).
311. Gardner, supra note 73, at 902. see Appell, supra note 308, at 582 (discussing the
limiting force of location on the lives of children).
2011] COUNTERING CRIMINALIZATION 365
children.  Consequently, expectations of privacy are likely to vary with
social and physical environments.”312
When youth are reconceived as people with “citizenship potential,”
rights take on a different role because the youth are now viewed as citi-
zenry having a developing capacity for autonomy.  Rather than entitle-
ments that protect an existing capacity they serve to cultivate a capacity
that is being created.  If student’s rights are recognized for their social-
izing role, schools can nurture adolescent’s emerging sense of privacy and
develop student’s capacity for autonomous choice though fastidious ap-
plication of students’ Fourth Amendment rights.
[T]hrough their daily experiences children and adolescents de-
velop . . . . [A] sense of themselves as separate from and connected
to others, an understanding of the conditions under which to seek
physical and psychological aloneness or interaction, and understand-
ing of the possible range of such experience, and the uses of each of
these for self-enhancement or regrouping.  At the same time, these
experiences give children and adolescents a view of societal norms
with respect to certain behaviors and activities and provide a way of
interpreting these as valued or not valued, good or bad.  In this way
children’s experiences with privacy feed back into their sense of self-
esteem and help define the range, limits, and consequences of indi-
vidual autonomy within our society.313
In fact, the Court has implicitly endorsed such a view in some of its
First Amendment cases involving free speech in public schools.314  In
these cases, the Court is concerned with how restrictions on free speech
and the free exchange of ideas will affect the citizenship potential of
schoolchildren.
312. Melton, supra note 310, at 490–91.
313. Gardner, supra note 73, at 901 (citation omitted).
314. See Bd. of Ed., Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853,
868 (1982) (holding that schools cannot remove books from the school library because of
their content; “In sum, just as access to ideas makes it possible for citizens generally to
exercise their rights of free speech and press in a meaningful manner, such access prepares
students for active and effective participation in the pluralistic, often contentious society in
which they will soon be adult members”).  W. Va. St. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S.
624, 637 (1943) (holding that schools cannot compel students to recite the pledge of alle-
giance).  “That they are educating the young for citizenship is [the] reason for scrupulous
protection of Constitutional freedoms [for] the individual, if we are not to strangle the free
mind at its source and teach youth to discount [the] important principles of our govern-
ment as mere platitudes.” Id. See also Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393
U.S. 503, 506 (1969) (holding that schools cannot prohibit students’ peaceful expression of
opinion; “It can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional
rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate”).
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Even assuming that adolescents’ brain plasticity and developmental im-
maturity makes them poor decision makers, “mental disability need not
obviate an adult’s status as a person,” and the same should be true for
adolescents.315  Rather, the fact that they are in a critical developmental
phase, progressing ever closer toward adult personhood, is exactly why
their fledging sense of autonomy should be respected and nurtured.316
Affording them the full measure of privacy guaranteed by the Fourth
Amendment is developmentally appropriate because it would actively en-
courage school officials and SRO’s to “support [the] gradual passage to-
wards adulthood . . . by granting [the student] the full rights of an adult
when his interests are jeopardized by the state action.”317  Also, it would
reduce the possibility for abuse by well-meaning, overzealous actors.
T.L.O. and Redding both recognize that students have a right to privacy,
albeit an abrogated one.318  However, there is reason to believe that in-
creased privacy rights for students would be psychologically and develop-
mentally beneficial.319
Furthermore, adolescents’ experience with privacy rights can impact
their legal socialization to the extent that these experiences shape their
attitudes toward law and legal authority.320  Notions of the legitimacy of
the law “are part of a broader developmental phenomenon of self-defini-
tion with regard to authority structures common to adolescence, and the
resolution of autonomy-related issues, including those involving relation-
ships with authority figures, is a central psychosocial task of this pe-
riod.”321  Although little research has been done regarding adolescent
legal socialization, research shows that adult legal socialization is directly
related to compliance with the law and cooperation with legal actors,
such as police.322
315. Gary B. Melton, Toward “Personhood” for Adolescents: Autonomy and Privacy
as Values in Public Policy, 38 AM. PSYCHOL. 99, 101 (1983).
316. See id. (recognizing an adolescent’s status as a developing member of society).
317. Irving R. Kaufman, Protecting the Rights of Minors: On Juvenile Autonomy and
the Limits of the Law, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1015, 1029 (1977).
318. Redding v. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2637–38 (2009); New
Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337–38 (1985).
319. See Melton, supra note 315 (supporting the notion that the effects of increased
adolescent freedom would be psychologically beneficial).
320. See Fagan & Tyler, supra note 7 (indicating that adolescent’s experiences “with
police and other legal actors subtly shapes their perceptions of the relation between indi-
viduals and society”).
321. Alex R. Piquero et al., Developmental Trajectories of Legal Socialization Among
Serious Adolescent Offenders, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 267, 272 (2005).
322. See generally TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (Princeton Univ.
Press 2006) (mentioning that there are two different perspectives one must understand in
order to answer the question of why people follow the law: instrumental and normative,
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However, one study focusing on adolescents found that perceptions of
procedural justice did correlate to views regarding the legitimacy of the
law.323  This suggests that adolescents who feel that they have been
treated fairly by legal authorities such as SROs will be legally socialized
to have a positive orientation toward legal authority in general.  There-
fore, a model of school searches and seizures that increases the percep-
tion of procedural justice will in turn increase institutional legitimacy and
compliance with school disciplinary rules in the long term.
C. Restoring the Balance
As Justice Kennedy wrote in Graham, “criminal procedure laws that
fail to take [a] defendant[‘s] youthfulness into account at all would be
flawed.”324  But how do we take “youthfulness into account” in a way
that is consistent with the creation of democratic citizens?  One way is to
identify the factors that make youthfulness an important consideration,
and then incorporate these factors into the reasonableness calculus.  With
regard to adolescents, their youthfulness is important because “this is the
developmental period during which individuals are beginning to form an
adult-like understanding of society and its institutions.”325  School search
jurisprudence can better account for the developmental realities of ado-
lescence in much the same way that Eighth Amendment jurisprudence
does now.
The Court arrived at the holdings in Simmons and Graham by referring
to “the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a matur-
ing society” inherent in the Eighth Amendment’s proscription against
cruel and unusual punishment.326  Similarly, the Fourth Amendment’s
reasonableness balancing test “does not operate in a vacuum; instead, it
must comport with evolving societal norms.”327  It is an evolving standard
with the former focusing on deterrence and avoiding penalties under the law, and the latter
focusing on “what is just and moral”).
323. See Piquero et al., supra note 321, 275–76 (providing the results of the test con-
ducted by Tyler, Casper, and Fisher using a sample of 628 people accused of felonies inter-
viewed prior to and just after their cases were heard).
324. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. __, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2031 (2010).
325. Piquero et al., supra note 321, at 268.
326. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560–61 (2005) (noting the Court’s use of the
text, history, tradition, and Eighth Amendment precedent when prohibiting cruel and unu-
sual punishment and have referred to the standards of decency to decide which punish-
ments are to be deemed cruel and unusual (citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100–01
(1958))); see also Graham, 560 U.S. at __, at 130 S. Ct. 2021–22 (2010) (citing Roper v.
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 572 (2005)).
327. Brief of Urban Justice Ctr. et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of the Respondents
at 30, Safford Unified Sch. Dist. #1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. __, 129 S. Ct. 2633 (2009) (No. 08-
479), 2009 WL 906572, at *30.  “[The Supreme] Court regularly consults the common law
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that is based on what “society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasona-
ble.’”328  The current school search and seizure model balances student
privacy interests against the state’s interest in maintaining safe schools.
This binary approach creates a false choice because there are other inter-
ests at stake.
I submit that both society and students have a significant interest in the
development of future citizens.  This interest, which I will refer to as a
“development interest,” should be taken into account when determining
what is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.  The framework that
emerges when the development interest is factored into the reasonable-
ness balance is a youth development approach to school search and
seizure because the development interest militates in favor of a school
search standard that promotes positive youth development, and demo-
cratic socialization.  “The greater the area in which juveniles are free to
pursue their own interests, and to act responsibly without interference,
the better able they are to respond to society’s many demands upon
them.”329
in clarifying the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 28. See, e.g., Wyoming v.
Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 299–300 (1999) (using the traditional standards of reasonableness
to evaluate the search or seizure by assessing the level of intrusion against the degree to
which the search or seizure is needed for the promotion of governmental interest); Wilson
v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 931 (1995); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 591 (1980) (stat-
ing that the Court has recognized that the common law provides crucial insight into “what
the Framers of the Amendment might have thought to be reasonable”); United States v.
Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 418–420 (1976) (stating that an arrest without an warrant was a
violation of the Fourth Amendment, however, in the interest of public safety and due ap-
prehension of criminals, arrest without a warrant should be made by law enforcement);
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925) (recognizing that common law provides
crucial insight into what was thought to be reasonable).  Historically, courts have recog-
nized the adaptive nature of the common law standard of reasonableness in tort actions.
Id.  See J. D. LEE & BARRY A. LINDAHL, 1 MODERN TORT LAW: LIABILITY AND LITIGA-
TION § 1.1 (2d ed. 2004) (describing “reasonableness” as a constantly changing concept that
evolves with the norms of society); Henry T. Terry, Negligence, 29 HARV. L. REV. 40,
48–49 (1915) (reasonableness is based on community standards which rely on the “teach-
ings of common experiences” of individuals at the time of the events in question).
328. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).  “In de-
termining the meaning of ‘reasonable,’ the Court, in effect, has created a common law of
reasonableness rather than relying on a constitutional definition found in the Fourth
Amendment.”  George C. Thomas III & Barry S. Pollack, Saving Rights From Remedy: A
Societal View of The Fourth Amendment, 73 B.U. L. REV. 147, 153–54 (1993).  “In this way,
the Fourth Amendment is like the Eighth Amendment, which also depends on a common-
sense notion of what society defines as ‘cruel and unusual punishment.’” Id. at 154.
329. Kaufman, supra note 317, at 1031.  Kaufman asserts that giving children responsi-
bility through the ability to pursue their own interest will increase their ability to “cope in
society as a functioning and responsible adult.” Id.
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Under this new paradigm, students’ Fourth Amendment rights become
a tool of democratic socialization, enhancing young people’s capacity for
autonomous decision making and lending legitimacy to the law and legal
authorities.  A youth development approach mandates a probable cause
standard, the standard that bestows the presumption of reasonableness
on all searches and seizures because it requires a particularized, articul-
able basis for suspecting a disciplinary violation has occurred before a
search can be undertaken.330
Some may argue that any “developmental interest” properly lies with
the “good kids” whose positive development depends on them not being
exposed to potential violence at school by their “bad” peers.  Undeniably
it is in the developmental interest of all children to be free from violence,
but because of the malleable character of youth, individuals should not be
lumped into the “good” or “bad” category so readily.  The development
interest discussed in this Article promotes respect and dignity among stu-
dents, teachers, and law enforcement officers; that in turn contribute to a
safer environment over time.  Just as the problem of violence and crime
in society at large will not be solved by mass incarceration, the problem
of violence in school will not be solved by an aggressively punitive ap-
proach toward those who are perceived as perpetrators.
Certainly, perpetrators of school violence must be dealt with in an ap-
propriate way, this Article argues that reducing expectations of privacy
for all students is not appropriate.  Safety and dignity can co-exist; the
balance between privacy and government intrusion that is inherent in the
probable cause standard is sufficient to achieve school safety without sac-
rificing student rights and thus impeding the development of future citi-
zens.  For those administrators and SROs, whose primary concern is
school safety, it is important to realize that a move to probable cause
would not foreclose such officials from conducting Terry stops (under a
reasonable suspicion standard) when necessary for safety.
The youth development approach would address the three ‘dangerous
lessons’ set forth in Part II of this Article.  First, it would give practical
meaning, based in actual experience, to the Constitution’s lofty guaran-
tees of privacy thus enhancing the “perception of rights as entitlements
applicable to oneself.”331  Second, the youth development approach
would encourage positive youth development because it would respect
adolescents’ developing sense of autonomy by requiring the state to “jus-
330. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810, 817–19 (1996) (holding searches
and seizures are presumed reasonable when police have probable cause).
331. Melton, supra note 315.  “An increase in freedom may also increase a sense of
efficacy.” Id.
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tify coercive intervention” into their privacy.332  Third, it would promote
an orientation toward law and legal authority that is based on respect and
trust rather than fear and control.  This will yield better developmental
outcomes for students because it nurtures pro-social rather than anti-so-
cial patterns of behavior.333  Moreover, it increases the perception of fair-
ness and equity of legal rules that fosters a sense of institutional
legitimacy towards schools’ disciplinary regimes.334
Furthermore, a shift to a probable cause standard would also address
the problem of the expanding nexus between school officials and law en-
forcement.  This was the elephant in the room in New Jersey v. T.L.O.
Since that case was decided, police have become a prevalent fixture in
public schools and it is more likely that disciplinary infractions will lead
to school-based arrests and even criminal prosecutions.335  Under a prob-
able cause standard, students who are searched and criminally prosecuted
332. Kaufman, supra note 317.  Kaufman evaluates the Juvenile Justice Standards Pro-
ject (“Standards”) in his article, focusing on the section of Standards entitled Rights of
Minors, and suggesting that the heart of Standards is the child’s need for support in passing
to adulthood. Id. at 1018, 1021, 1029.  Kaufman notes that the responsible child will some-
times require guidance in the form of constraint by family and schools, but equally impor-
tant is the child’s need to be able to act “independently of governmental interference.” Id.
at 1031.
333. See People v. Scott D., 315 N.E.2d 466, 470 (N.Y. 1974).
[A]lthough the necessities for a public school search may be greater than for one
outside the school, the psychological damage that would be risked on sensitive chil-
dren by random search insufficiently justified by the necessities is not tolerable.  And
it must also be emphasized that the scope of permissible search and, for that matter,
the scope of undue risk of psychological harm, will vary significantly with the age and
mental development of the child.
Id.
334. Fagan & Tyler, supra note 7.
[W]hat adolescents see and experience through interactions with police and other le-
gal actors subtly shapes their perceptions of the relation between individuals and soci-
ety.  These experiences influence the development of their notions of law, rules, and
agreements among members of society, and the legitimacy of authority to deal fairly
with citizens who violate society’s rules.
Id.
335. See Stephen Cox & Mario Gaboury, Abstract, Creating More Labels: Examining
Juvenile Arrests in Urban and Suburban Police Departments (Am. Soc’y of Criminology,
Working Paper, 2011), available at http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p33380_index.html.
(analyzing juvenile arrest data from a large Connecticut city and two neighboring towns,
and finding that the majority of police arrests in the city were at public schools and were
typically made by school-based police officers); ACLU, HARD LESSONS: SCHOOL RE-
SOURCE OFFICER PROGRAMS AND SCHOOL BASED ARRESTS IN THREE CONNECTICUT
TOWNS 9 (2008), available at http://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/racialjustice/hardles-
sons_november2008.pdf (finding a high rate of school based arrests by SROs in the two of
the three school districts studied, the third district had higher suspension and expulsion
rates which perhaps obviated the need for school based arrests).
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based on the fruits of the search, will have weightier grounds to support
suppression motions.  Probable cause would alter the current methodol-
ogy of school discipline wherein every student is viewed as a potential
safety threat and treated like a criminal suspect when accused of violating
school rules.336  Moreover, probable cause would place limits on the dis-
cretion of school officials and SRO’s “bent upon searching particular stu-
dents suspected of wrongdoing at school,” and who, under the current
framework, have very “few constraints.”337
Probable cause in school searches is also a more appropriate standard
for an institution concerned with the development of citizens because:
[T]he makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions
favorable to the pursuit of happiness.  They recognized the signifi-
cance of man’s spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect.
They knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure and satisfactions of
life are to be found in material things.  They sought to protect Amer-
icans and their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensa-
tions.  They conferred, as against the government, the right to be let
alone - the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued
by civilized men.338
336. See Gardner, supra note 73, at 943.
In a very real sense, each and every student stands accused, has become a “suspect,” in
generalized school searches, especially given the special relationship of trust which
supposedly exists between student and teacher.  Surely a student even indirectly ac-
cused by his teacher as a possible thief or drug user suffers a greater indignity and loss
of self-esteem by being subjected to a generalized search than does an airline passen-
ger passing through a metal detector or a driver a checkpoint.
Id.  To support this he continues by writing:
Research psychologists have discovered that two of the most stressful events in the
lives of young people (fourth through sixth graders) are being accused of lying and
being sent to the school principal.  Presumably, therefore, students perceive being ac-
cused of wrongdoing at school as extremely stressful, both because of a fear of un-
pleasant sanctions and because the accusations are experienced by the young person
as an affront to personal dignity and self-esteem.
Id. at 943 n.196.
337. See id. at 947.  Gardner points out that T.L.O. “provides the constitutional basis
for requiring individualized suspicion,” which will hopefully result in the condemnation of
“generalized searches and seizures in schools.” Id. According to Gardner, an individual-
ized suspicion requirement will provide students an entitled “modicum of . . . privacy pro-
tection.” Id.
338. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
Olmstead involved wire tapping of private telephone conversations, the conversations were
then used as evidence against Defendants’ conspiracy, and the Supreme Court determined
the wire-tapping was not a search. Id. at 455, 469.  It is relevant to note that a later case,
Katz v. United States, resulted in the Supreme Court’s decision that wire-tapping a phone
booth was a search in violation of the Fourth Amendment.  Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 352, 359 (1967).
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If the most “comprehensive” and “valued” right is not being recog-
nized and respected by those charged with socializing young people, how
can these youth, particularly those from inner-city communities, be ex-
pected to become active and engaged contributors to American society?
Thus, probable cause is a more suitable standard in school searches
because it is developmentally appropriate and sends a message to stu-
dents that they are entitled to the rights and protections of citizenship,
thus restoring legitimacy and encouraging engagement and participation
in civil society.  Respecting the rights of youth encourages positive youth
development instead of preparing students for a life of reduced privacy,
i.e., probation, prison, or parole; thus, school becomes an ecological de-
velopment asset, building resiliency through bestowing a much-needed
sense of autonomy.  While a youth development approach to school
searches that adopts a probable cause standard is not a panacea for our
ailing public school system, if implemented correctly, it is one small step
toward educating for citizenship and restoring legitimacy of the rule of
law in the eyes of marginalized youth.
A youth development approach to school searches also requires
changes in the way school searches are conducted.  A doctrinal shift to
probable cause is not enough because even if the Court overrules T.L.O.,
it cannot legislate best practices from the bench.  Boards of education
must adopt policies that assure the probable cause standard is imple-
mented in a manner that respects student’s rights and fosters positive
youth development.  Capitalizing on the socializing value of rights, SROs
and school officials should always inform students of their rights before
conducting a search and explain why the student is being searched.  In
addition, police involvement in all school searches should be limited as
much as possible.  Clear standards should govern when and how the fruits
of school searches are turned over to police for law enforcement pur-
poses.339  School search practices can be modified to this end even under
the reasonable suspicion school standard.340
339. See CATHERINE Y. KIM & I. INDIA GERONIMO, ACLU, POLICING IN SCHOOLS:
DEVELOPING A GOVERNANCE DOCUMENT FOR SCHOOL RESOURCE OFFICERS IN K-12
SCHOOLS 8, 13, 32–34 (2009), available at http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/racialjustice/
whitepaper_policinginschools.pdf (arguing that schools should enter into agreements with
law enforcement agencies regarding the scope of the relationship between the school and
the police, including which offenses should be handled by law enforcement and which
should be handled by school officials).
340. Id. at 17, 33.  In fact, under a reasonable suspicion standard, it is even more
important for schools and law enforcement to memorialize the nature and scope of the
relationship. Id.
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V. CONCLUSION
The authority of those who teach is often an obstacle to
those who want to learn.
— Cicero
The current reality in urban public schools is that students are sub-
jected to a pedagogy of punishment that treats students as if they pose a
threat to society rather than as if they are young citizens deserving of
autonomy and personhood status.  Students in the public education sys-
tem are often treated like criminals, and this is exacerbated by reduced
Fourth Amendment protections in school searches.  Abrogating Fourth
Amendment rights of students in the name of public safety is not good
public policy because such measures, in conjunction with other harsh dis-
ciplinary practices and increased police presence in schools, fail to
achieve their purported public safety outcomes in the long term.  Rather,
such policies may actually induce youth to behave more anti-socially, ren-
dering schools less safe.  Therefore, although the safety gains are low, the
developmental setbacks for the developing adolescent are high: when stu-
dents are treated as threats to society, they become threats to society.
The counterproductive nature of these policies stems from the fact that
they do not account for the developmental needs of adolescents, thus
they produce outcomes that are inconsistent with the stated objectives of
public education.
Schools should not cultivate authoritarian environments where school
officials wield absolute and unfettered power.  Rather, their disciplinary
policies and practices should comport with their special role in the sociali-
zation of future democratic citizens; to this end, they should respect stu-
dents’ autonomy, dignity, and individual rights.  School search law should
reflect a developmentally accurate assessment of public safety concerns,
students’ privacy interests, and the joint interest of students and society in
the creation of democratic, law-abiding citizens.  A youth development
approach to school searches incorporates this joint interest into the rea-
sonableness determination and, in doing so, calls for a probable cause
standard in school searches.
